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How Exclusive Is the Workers’ Compensation Exclusive 
Remedy?  2010 Amendments to Oklahoma Workers’ 
Compensation Statute Shoot Down Parret 
I. Introduction 
Workers’ compensation generally provides the exclusive remedy for 
injured employees.1 That is, employees injured on the job must pursue their 
claims against their employers through the workers’ compensation system 
rather than through the traditional common law court system in which 
plaintiffs ordinarily pursue tort claims. Not only are injured employees 
jurisdictionally limited to the workers’ compensation courts in pursuing 
claims against employers, their recovery for personal injuries sustained on 
the job is also limited to the relief afforded them through the workers’ 
compensation system—thus the determination of liability is also exclusive. 
The workers’ compensation exclusive remedy limitation developed 
through a delicate legislative compromise in response to competing public 
policy concerns.2  In this compromise, “both the employer and the 
employee relinquished certain rights to obtain other advantages.”3  When an 
employer intentionally injures an employee, however, the public policy 
rationale motivating workers’ compensation exclusivity is weakened.  In 
fact, many states have recognized an exception to the exclusive remedy 
limitation if the employer intentionally injures the employee.4  In those 
situations, the employee’s remedy is not limited to those available under the 
workers’ compensation system.5  Instead, the employee may choose to 
pursue his or her claim either through the workers’ compensation system or 
through the traditional common law court system.6 
Now that the door allowing an exception to the workers’ compensation 
exclusive remedy has been opened for an employer’s intentional 
misconduct, the debate regarding how to define intent for purposes of this 
exception is raging in state courts and legislatures across the country.7  Two 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See, e.g., 85 OKLA. STAT. § 302 (2011). 
 2. See Kohr v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1070, 1072 (E.D. Pa. 1981) 
(quoting Wagner v. Nat’l Indem. Co., 422 A.2d 1061, 1065 (Pa. 1980)). 
 3. See id. 
 4. See Appendix. 
 5. See, e.g., 85 OKLA. STAT. § 302. 
 6. See, e.g., id. 
 7. See Appendix. 
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primary definitions of intent compete for acceptance:  (1) purpose to cause 
injury and (2) knowledge of the substantial certainty of injury.8  Behind this 
conflict is the public policy question of what weight to give the rights of 
injured employees to workplace safety and automatic compensation versus 
employers’ interests in limited and foreseeable liability. 
In the most recent legislative session, Oklahoma’s legislature 
authoritatively weighed in on the debate, defining “intent” for purposes of 
the exclusivity provision as the “willful, deliberate, specific intent of the 
employer to cause such injury.”9  In so doing, the Oklahoma legislature 
effectively overturned the Oklahoma Supreme Court decision Parret v. 
UNICCO Service Co.  In Parret, the court adopted a broader definition of 
intent than the current statutory formulation, holding that intent includes:  
(1) purpose to injure and (2) knowledge of the substantial certainty of 
injury.10 
Part II of this note discusses the historical context in which workers’ 
compensation laws developed and the policies motivating these laws.  Part 
III explains the two competing standards for intent-based exceptions to 
workers’ compensation exclusivity and analyzes how courts have applied 
the two standards.  Part IV explores Oklahoma’s approach to defining 
intent.  This part begins by tracing the evolution of the intentional tort 
exception in pre-Parret cases, continues with a thorough analysis of the 
Parret decision and Parret’s application in subsequent cases, and concludes 
with an overview of the legislature’s 2010 response as manifested in the 
amended statute.  Part V analyzes the competing standards in light of the 
policies motivating workers’ compensation law.  Considering these 
policies, this part argues that the Oklahoma legislature adopted the proper 
standard of intent—purpose to injure.  Part VI briefly summarizes and 
concludes. 
II. Historical Context Motivating Workers’ Compensation Statutes and 
Oklahoma’s Codification of Workers’ Compensation 
A. An Industrial Bargain Between Employers and Employees 
The socio-economic climate of America at the turn of the twentieth 
century demanded legislation to protect workers.11  As the United States 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See Davis v. CMS Cont’l Natural Gas, Inc., 23 P.3d 288, 294 (Okla. 2001). 
 9. 85 OKLA. STAT. § 302. 
 10. See Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 579 (Okla. 2005), superseded by 
statute, 2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 2032-33. 
 11. Id. at 577-78. 
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rapidly industrialized, workplace injuries skyrocketed.12  At the same time, 
employees could not recover for these injuries against their employers 
because common law defenses such as assumption of risk, contributory 
negligence, and the fellow servant doctrine shielded employers from 
liability.13  The injuries workers sustained frequently resulted in permanent 
disability.14  As a result, the injured employee—often his family’s sole 
breadwinner—could not earn a living, leaving his family destitute.15 
Workers’ compensation statutes, first enacted in 1908 and now adopted 
in every state, emerged to address this problem.16  These statutes are 
primarily designed to prevent injured workers and their families from 
falling into destitution.17  Workers’ compensation benefits provide injured 
employees and their families a modest living and “prevent them from 
becoming public charges.”18  Initially, these statutes covered only 
employees in ultra-hazardous occupations; however, today, workers’ 
compensation has been expanded to cover workers in nearly every 
occupation.19   
To achieve these purposes, an “industrial bargain” was imposed upon 
injured employees and their employers.20  Employees “gave up the right to 
bring a common law negligence action against the employer.”21  In return, 
employees received automatic benefits irrespective of the employer’s 
fault.22  These guaranteed benefits reduced the costs, delay, and uncertainty 
of litigation, providing employees with a “swift and certain” recovery.23 
Employers, on the other hand, gave up common law defenses such as 
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow servant 
doctrine.  Historically, when asserted, the fellow servant doctrine entirely 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See id; see also 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 2.08 
(rev. ed. 2011) (“[I]n 1963, the last state, Hawaii, came under the system.”). 
 17. Parret, 127 P.3d at 577-78. 
 18. Id. (quoting Corbin v. Wilkinson, 53 P.2d 45, 48 (Or. 1935)). 
 19. See 1 LARSON, supra note 16, § 2.07 (“All but one [state], Wyoming, have since 
broadened their scope.”); see also Ragsdale v. Wheelabrator Clean Water Sys., Inc., 959 
P.2d 20, 22 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998). 
 20. Parret, 127 P.3d at 578. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. 
 23. See Copass v. Ill. Power Co., 569 N.E.2d 1211, 1216 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
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denied the injured employee’s recovery.24  In return for relinquishment of 
common law defenses, the employer “received reduced exposure to 
liability”25 as the employer’s liability under workers’ compensation 
schemes is both “limited and determinate.”26 
B. How Workers’ Compensation Works 
The hallmark of workers’ compensation is the employee’s automatic 
entitlement to predetermined benefits if the employee “suffers a ‘personal 
injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.’”27  
Types of compensable injuries, unlike tort, are limited to those “which 
either actually or presumptively produce disability and thereby presumably 
affect earning power.”28   
In this system, fault proves generally immaterial, both from the 
perspective of the employee and the employer.  An employee’s contributory 
negligence fails to bar or reduce recovery, and an employer’s freedom from 
fault does not abrogate or reduce his liability.29  If “an employee 
experiences . . . a job related injury, the employer is obligated to make 
payments pursuant to the Act”.30 
Workers’ compensation benefits are predetermined, based upon the 
employee’s: (1) average weekly wage; (2) length of disability (permanent 
or temporary); (3) extent of disability (total or partial); and (4) type of 
injury.31  Considering these factors, an employee’s cash-wage benefits 
generally consist of “one-half to two-thirds of the employee’s average 
weekly wage.”32  In addition to the cash-wage benefits, injured employees 
are typically also entitled to reimbursement for related medical expenses.33  
These benefits are usually subject to “arbitrary maximum and minimum 
limits.”34 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Parret, 127 P.3d at 578. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Kittell v. Vt. Weatherboard, Inc., 417 A.2d 926, 927 (Vt. 1980) (quoting Morrisseau 
v. Legac, 181 A.2d 53, 57 (1962)).  
 27. 1 LARSON, supra note 16, § 1.01 (emphasis added). 
 28. Id. § 1.03(4).  For example, workers’ compensation does not provide benefits for 
pain and suffering, loss of consortium, or conscious suffering.   
 29. Id. § 1.01. 
 30. Edward John Main, Bad Faith in the Workers’ Compensation Context:  A Cause in 
Search of an Action, 30 TULSA L.J. 507, 509 (1995) (footnote omitted). 
 31. See, e.g., 85 OKLA. STAT. §§ 331-334 (2011). 
 32. 1 LARSON, supra note 16, § 1.01. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
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Ordinarily, administrative commissions oversee the workers’ 
compensation system.35  Employers are required to secure workers’ 
compensation liability through “private insurance, state-fund insurance . . . 
or self-insurance,” depending on the state.36  The costs of these insurance 
premiums are then included in the cost of production and reflected in the 
price of the employer’s goods or services, thereby shiftingthe burden of 
compensating injured employees from the employer to the consuming 
public.37 
C. Workers’ Compensation as the Exclusive Remedy 
In exchange for guaranteed benefits, the employee relinquishes his 
common law right to sue his employer “for damages for any injury covered 
by the act.”38  Effectively, workers’ compensation has become the exclusive 
remedy for injured employees.  The purpose of the exclusivity of the 
remedy mirrors that of workers’ compensation generally—to shift “the 
burden of all work-related injuries from individual employers and 
employees to the consuming public with the concept of fault being virtually 
immaterial.”39 
Nevertheless, exceptions to workers’ compensation exclusivity have 
developed both judicially and legislatively.40  One of these exceptions 
allows an employee intentionally injured by his employer to pursue a 
common law tort suit for damages against that employer.41 
The primary basis for this exception is that an employer’s intentional 
torts against an employee fall outside the scope of, and therefore are not 
covered by, workers’ compensation.  Workers’ compensation guarantees 
employees benefits for accidental injuries sustained during the course of 
employment.  But an employer’s intentional torts against an employee fall 
outside this scope for two reasons.  First, an employer’s intentional tort “is 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., 85 OKLA. STAT. § 302 (2011) (providing the exclusive remedy “except in 
the case of an intentional tort, or where the employer has failed to secure the payment of 
compensation for the injured employee” as required by the workers’ compensation statute). 
 41. See id. 
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not accidental and therefore not covered by the act.”42  Second, the 
intentional nature of the harm severs the employer-employee relationship.43 
Because intentional torts are outside its scope, workers’ compensation 
provides no remedy at all for intentional injuries.  Accordingly, employees 
injured by the intentional torts of their employers should not be subject to 
workers’ compensation exclusivity.  Instead, these employees should be 
allowed to pursue their common law claims for damages against their 
employer. 
The issue then, becomes how to define intent for purpose of the 
intentional torts exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity.  States 
split between: (1) adopting the more exacting, and therefore more 
exclusive, “standard of purpose to cause injury” and (2) adopting the more 
liberal, and therefore less exclusive, standard of “knowledge to a substantial 
certainty that injury will result.”44 
III. The Dueling Standards:  Purpose vs. Substantial Certainty 
A. Purpose 
Outside the workers’ compensation system, two intrinsically different 
standards of intent allow an employee to bring a claim against the 
employer.  The first of those standards of intent is the “purpose” to injure 
standard.   
1. Overview 
The modern view of the intentional tort exception to workers’ 
compensation exclusivity is that only an employer’s purpose to cause injury 
satisfies the requisite standard of intent for the exception to apply.45  Today, 
a clear majority of jurisdictions that have an intentional tort exception to 
workers’ compensation exclusivity have adopted the purpose standard.46 
Courts adopting this standard employ various formulations of the 
standard, including:  deliberate intent, specific intent, actual intent, and true 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Van Biene v. Era Helicopters, Inc., 779 P.2d 315, 318 (Alaska 1989) (quoting 
Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 526 P.2d 37, 43 n.29 (Alaska 1974), overruled on 
other grounds, 556 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1976)). 
 43. Guerrero, 230 S.W.3d at 298 (quoting Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Co., 
230 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Ark. 1950)). 
 44. See Appendix. 
 45. See Copass v. Ill. Power Co., 569 N.E.2d 1211, 1216 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
 46. See Appendix; see also Van Biene, 779 P.2d at 319. 
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intent.47  In all variations, however, each court applying the standard is 
describing “purpose” to injure:  a person acts with purpose to cause injury 
when the person’s conscious object is to cause the injury.48 
Many of these jurisdictions have determined that purpose “implies the 
formation by the employer of a specific intention to cause injury or death 
combined with some action aimed at accomplishing such result, as opposed 
to mere employer negligence or gross negligence.”49 
Because an employer’s purpose to cause harm is sufficient to bring an 
employee’s claim within the intentional tort exception, the employee is not 
additionally required to show that injury was substantially certain to 
result.50 
2. How the Purpose Standard Is Applied 
The purpose standard is exacting.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court in 
Parret noted that “in any jurisdiction applying the ‘specific intent’ standard, 
‘unless the case involves an assault or a battery, recovery will probably be 
denied.’”51 
As the Parret court observed, an employer’s assault of an employee is 
usually sufficient to bring the employee’s claim outside the coverage of 
workers’ compensation.  For example, in Sitzman v. Schumaker,52 an 
employee worked for his employer providing general ranch labor.53  
Following an argument, the employer struck the employee several times in 
the face.54  The employee responded, pushing the employer to the ground.55  
The employer then picked up a four-foot piece of two-inch pipe.56  The 
employee asked the employer not to hit him with the pipe, but as the 
employee turned to walk away, the employer hit the employee in the back 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., 503 A.2d 708, 711 (Md. 
1986) (using “specific” and “deliberate” intent); Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 
575 (Okla. 2005), superseded by statute 2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 2032-33 (recognizing an 
exception in many jurisdictions when an employer acts “deliberately and with the actual 
intent to cause injury”). 
 48. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (2010). 
 49. Johnson, 503 A.2d at 711. 
 50. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 1 cmt. c (2010). 
 51. Parret, 127 P.3d at 575 (quoting 48 AM. JUR. 2d Proof of Facts § 2 (1987)). 
 52. Sitzman v. Schumaker, 718 P.2d 657 (Mont. 1986). 
 53. Id. at 658. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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of the head with the pipe.57  As the employee maneuvered to protect 
himself, the employer hit him again with the pipe, this time in the front of 
the head.58  This final blow cracked the employee’s skull, rendered him 
unconscious, and ultimately caused life altering injuries.59 
The court held:  “The egregiousness of these circumstances removes the 
exclusivity bar for an employee.”60  It explained that shielding an employer 
from tort liability when he assaults his employee would entirely disregard 
the quid pro quo of the industrial bargain between employers and 
employees.61  If this were not the case, the employer could effectively 
obtain insurance coverage for the right to assault his employees and spread 
that cost over other employers who participate in the system.62   
Even if an employee alleges employer misconduct that rises to the level 
of purpose to injure, however, the employee will likely fail.  In the face of 
culpable employer conduct, unless the facts clearly show the employer’s 
purpose to injure, the employee will fail to satisfy this high standard. 
In Davis v. U.S. Employers Council, Inc.,63 for example, an employee 
worked as an automobile painter.64  The employee and others repeatedly 
informed their employer of severe respiratory symptoms they were 
experiencing and complained of inadequate ventilation.65  As a result of 
exposure to toxic levels of paint fumes, the employee was diagnosed with 
“chronic toxic encephalopathy, with organic brain damage.”66 
The court assumed the employer knew that the employee and others had 
been exposed to toxic levels of paint fumes and that these fumes were 
causing severe respiratory symptoms.67  Furthermore, the court assumed the 
employer knew that if it did not provide adequate ventilation, the employee 
or “some other similarly situated employee was certain to suffer severe 
injury.”68  Notwithstanding this knowledge, the employer allegedly failed to 
provide adequate ventilation.69  The employee conceded that the employer, 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 659. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Davis v. U.S. Emp’rs Council, Inc., 934 P.2d 1142 (Or. Ct. App. 1997). 
 64. Id. at 1144. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1146. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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in failing to provide the ventilation, was motivated by a desire to save 
money.70 
Despite the employer’s actual knowledge that a working condition was 
causing injury, the court barred the employee’s claim, stating that the sine 
qua non of the intentional tort exception is the employer’s purpose to harm 
the employee.71  The employee’s acknowledgement that the employer was 
motivated by a desire to save money rather than to injure the employee 
precluded recovery outside of workers’ compensation.72 
B. Substantial Certainty 
The second of the two primary intent standards recognized for an 
employer’s conduct to fall within the intentional tort exception to workers’ 
compensation exclusivity is the “substantial certainty” standard. 
1. Overview 
A significant minority of states now allow an employee to bring a 
common law suit outside of the workers compensation system when the 
employer was substantially certain an employee would be injured, even if 
injury to the employee was not the purpose of the employer.73 
The substantial certainty standard proves consistent with the Restatement 
(Second) of Tort’s dual definition of intent, which provides that intent 
“denote[s] that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or 
that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result 
from it.”74 
To satisfy this standard, an employee need not prove that the employer 
acted with purpose to injure the employee; it is sufficient to show that the 
employer was substantially certain injury would result.75  The substantial 
certainty standard is a subjective standard.76  The employer must be 
subjectively aware of the substantial certainty of resulting injury; it is not 
sufficient that the injury is objectively substantially certain to occur.77 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Appendix; see also King v. Penrod Drilling Co., 652 F. Supp. 1331, 1334 (D. 
Nev. 1987); see, e.g., Jones v. V.I.P. Dev. Co., 472 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1984), superseded by 
statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01 (West 2011). 
 74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). 
 75. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 1 cmt. c (2010). 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. 
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An employee does not carry his burden by demonstrating the employer’s 
knowledge of foreseeable risk, a high probability of risk, or even a 
substantial likelihood of risk.78  On the other hand, the employee is not 
required to demonstrate the employer’s awareness of the actual or virtual 
certainty of the injury.79 Instead, the employee must show that the employer 
was aware of the substantial certainty of injury to the employee.80  
2. How the Substantial Certainty Standard Is Applied 
Cases in which courts have applied the substantial certainty standard to 
allow a common law tort claim have generally involved “a localized job-
site hazard, which threatens harm to a small number of identifiable 
employees during a relatively limited period of time.”81  The substantial 
certainty standard “loses its persuasiveness when the identity of potential 
victims becomes vaguer and when, in a related way, the time frame 
involving the actor’s conduct expands and the causal sequence connecting 
conduct and harm becomes more complex.”82 
To illustrate this point, the Restatement (Third) of Torts provides two 
contrasting examples.  In the first scenario, a land developer constructing a 
high-rise building “can confidently predict that some number of workers 
will be seriously injured in the course of the construction project.”83  
Despite the developer’s knowledge, the owner is guilty of neither an 
intentional tort nor even negligence.84 
In the second scenario, an employer provides a machine lacking adequate 
safety guards to its employees.85  The employer knows that employees use 
this machine and that over time, an employee is substantially certain to be 
injured.86  Courts applying the substantial certainty standard generally find 
this type of action satisfies the standard and exempts the employee’s claim 
from workers’ compensation exclusivity.87  
                                                                                                                 
 78. Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 579 (Okla. 2005), superseded by 
statute, 2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 2032-33. 
 79. Sorban v. Sterling Eng’g Corp., 830 A.2d 372, 379 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003). 
 80. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 1 cmt. c. 
 81. Id. § 1 cmt. e. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. § 1 reporter’s note to cmt. e (citing Rose v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., 472 
S.E.2d 774 (N.C. 1996)). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss1/3
2012] NOTES 85 
 
 
In Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,88 a New Jersey case, an 
employee sued his employer for:  (1) intentionally exposing the employee 
to a known danger, asbestos; (2) withholding the nature of that danger from 
the employee; and (3) withholding specific information obtained during the 
employee’s physical examination which revealed existing injuries caused 
by exposure to asbestos.89 
As part of the employer’s medical benefits, the employer’s physicians 
provided employees with routine physical examinations.90  Although chest 
x-rays taken during one of these physical examinations revealed asbestos-
related injuries, the physicians failed to inform the employee of the 
injuries.91  The employee alleged this concealment was part of a concerted 
corporate plan to prevent employees from leaving the workforce.92  As a 
result of both the initial exposure to asbestos and this concealment of 
existing injuries, the employee suffered severe and irreversible injury.93 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the employee’s claim based 
upon the initial exposure to asbestos in the workplace was barred by 
workers’ compensation exclusivity.94  The court, however, applying the 
substantial certainty standard, allowed the tort claim for aggravation of 
existing injuries caused by the fraudulent concealment of the existing 
injuries.95  The court explained that there “is a difference between . . . 
tolerating . . . conditions that will result in a certain number of injuries . . . 
and . . . actively misleading the employees who have already fallen victim 
to those risks”96, finding that the concealment of existing known injuries is 
outside the industrial bargain struck between employers and employees and 
is beyond the scope of tort liability from which the legislature intended to 
exempt the employer.97 
Similar to Davis v. U.S. Employers Council, Inc., the employee in 
Millison acknowledged that the employer concealed the existing injury to 
prevent the employee and others from leaving the workforce rather than out 
                                                                                                                 
 88. 501 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1985). 
 89. See id. at 508. 
 90. Id. at 516. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 507. 
 94. Id. at 519. 
 95. See id. at 514, 516. 
 96. Id. at 516. 
 97. Id. 
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of a desire to injure the employee.98  Had the court applied the purpose 
standard as in Davis, the employee’s claim for fraudulent concealment 
likely would have been barred as was the employee’s claim in Davis.99  
While a minority of states will allow plaintiffs relief upon a showing of 
substantial certainty, mere negligence is not sufficient to justify that relief.  
For example, in Jensen v. Sport Bowl, Inc.,100 a fourteen-year-old employee 
worked for a bowling alley as a pinchaser.101  The young employee’s job 
responsibilities included wiping oil from the automatic pinsetting 
machines.102  One night, the employee’s right index finger was severed 
when a rag he was using to clean the automatic pinsetting machine got 
stuck in a moving pulley.103  The employee filed a tort claim against his 
employer, alleging that the employer was substantially certain that injury 
would result.104 
The court, viewing the allegations in a light most favorable to the 
employee, determined that the employee “was an inexperienced, 
inadequately trained, 14-year-old boy ordered by his employer, without any 
warning of the danger, to perform a maintenance task which the employer 
knew from personal experience to be risky.”105  The court held, however, 
that even though the boy’s employment violated child labor regulations and 
even though the employer knew the assigned task was risky, the alleged 
facts did not demonstrate the employer was substantially certain that injury 
would result.106  Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the employer.107 
IV. Oklahoma’s Approach to Defining Intent for Purposes of the Exception 
to the Exclusivity Provision of Workers’ Compensation 
The Oklahoma Worker’s Compensation Act delineates the rights of an 
employee to recover from his employer for an on-the-job injury.  An 
employer subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act must:  
                                                                                                                 
 98. See id.; Davis v. U.S. Emp’rs Council, Inc., 934 P.2d 1142, 1146 (Or. Ct. App. 
1997). 
 99. See Davis, 934 P.2d at 1146. 
 100. 469 N.W.2d 370 (S.D. 1991). 
 101. Id. at 370. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 372. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. 
 107. Id. 
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pay or provide benefits according to the provisions of this act for 
the accidental injury or death of an employee arising out of and 
in the course of his or her employment, without regard to fault 
for such injury, if the employee's contract of employment was 
made or if the injury occurred within this state.108   
Under this statute, employee benefits are automatic and predetermined 
based upon the employee’s average weekly wage and the duration, degree, 
and type of injury.109  These benefits are exclusive.110 
Before the 2010 amendments to the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation 
Act, there was not a statutory exception in Oklahoma to the workers’ 
compensation exclusive remedy provision for intentional injuries.  Instead, 
the intentional tort exception was judicially constructed.111  Consequently, 
there was not a statutory definition of “intent” for this exception. 
As the following cases will show, Oklahoma courts struggled to define 
the parameters of the intentional tort exception from 1917 through the 
Parret v. UNICCO Service Co. case in 2005.  Then, in 2010, the Oklahoma 
legislature authoritatively weighed in, effectively overturning Parret and 
codifying the “purpose to injure” standard.112 
A. The Road to Parret v. UNICCO Service Co.:  A Survey of Pre-Parret 
Decisions  
The basis for the intentional tort exception created by Oklahoma case 
law is that an employer’s intentional tort against an employee is, by 
definition, not accidental.113  Since workers’ compensation covers only 
accidental injuries, the act does not cover an employer’s intentional torts 
against its employees.114  Because the act does not address an employer’s 
intentional torts, the act cannot provide the exclusive remedy.115  Therefore, 
                                                                                                                 
 108. 85 OKLA. STAT. § 310 (2011). 
 109. See id. §§ 331-334. 
 110. See id. § 302. 
 111. See Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 574 (Okla. 2005), superseded by 
statute, 2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 2032-33. 
 112. 85 OKLA. STAT. § 12 (Supp. 2010). 
 113. See Roberts v. Barclay, 369 P.2d 808, 809 (Okla. 1962). 
 114. See Thompson v. Madison Mach. Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 565, 568 (Okla. Civ. App. 
1984) (quoting Hull v. Wolfe, 393 P.2d 491, 493 (Okla. 1964)) (“[T]he Act was intended to 
cover all accidental injuries, but did not include willful or intentional injuries whether 
inflicted by the employer or the employee, since same was not accidental.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 115. See Roberts, 369 P.2d at 809. 
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an employee should not be precluded from pursuing common law tort 
claims arising out of an employer’s intentional tort.116 
As soon as an exception is made to exclusivity for intentional torts of the 
employer, the definition of intent becomes highly significant.  Oklahoma 
courts have “long recognized . . . that in some cases ‘an employee who has 
been wilfully injured by his employer [may] ha[ve] a common law action 
for damages.”117  As early as 1917, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that 
worker’s compensation did not cover an employer’s willful or intentional 
conduct and accordingly an employee maintained his common law rights to 
sue his employer for such conduct in tort.118 
An employee’s negligence claim is insufficient to fall within the 
intentional tort exception in Oklahoma.119  In Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co., a 
baker filed a negligence claim against his employer when natural gas used 
to heat an oven in the bakery exploded.120  The explosion burned the baker, 
severely scarring his entire body, including his face, head, back, arms, and 
hands.121  Because the baker claimed the injuries were caused by the 
negligence of the employer, rather than the willful or intentional conduct of 
the employer, the court held that the baker’s claims were barred by the 
exclusivity of workers’ compensation.122 
At the other end of the spectrum, a physical assault is sufficient to bring 
an employee’s claim within the intentional tort exception.123  An employee 
                                                                                                                 
 116. See id. (“Since our Workmen’s Compensation Law by its terms applies only to 
disability or death resulting from accidental injuries . . . it may be conceded that an 
employee who has been wilfully injured by his employer has a common law action for 
damages.” (citation omitted)). 
 117. Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 574 (Okla. 2005), superseded by statute 
2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 2032-33 (alterations in original) (quoting Roberts, 369 P.2d at 809). 
 118. See Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co., 162 P. 938, 945-46 (Okla. 1917). 
 119. See, e.g., id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. The baker appealed, arguing the statute denied the baker equal protection 
under the law because the statute covered only accidental injuries, thereby denying the baker 
compensation for the employer’s intentional conduct.  The court upheld the constitutionality 
of the statute, holding that although the statute only applies to accidental injuries, the statute 
does not deny injured employees equal protection because the act “leaves the injured 
employe[e] to his remedy as it existed when the act was passed” regarding the employer’s 
intentional torts.  Id. at 945. 
 123. See Thompson v. Madison Mach. Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 565, 568 (Okla. Civ. App. 
1984); see also Pursell v. Pizza Inn Inc., 786 P.2d 716 (Okla. Civ. App. 1990) (holding that 
employees’ common law suit against supervisors for sexual battery and assault was not 
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brought a tort claim against his employer in Thompson v. Madison 
Machinery Co.124 when a co-employee struck the employee “in the face 
with a twelve inch crescent wrench during an argument.”125  The Oklahoma 
Civil Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the employer and held that workers’ compensation is 
not the exclusive remedy for willful, intentional, or violent acts, as these 
acts are not accidental.126  The court explained that workers’ compensation 
was not “designed to shield employers or co-employees from willful, 
intentional or even violent conduct.”127  
Like courts in virtually every other jurisdiction, Oklahoma courts have 
struggled to articulate a standard that adequately addresses employee claims 
arising in the vast grey area between negligence and purpose that includes 
gross negligence, recklessness, knowledge of a foreseeable risk, knowledge 
of a substantially certain risk, and various gradations between these 
standards. 
For example, the court initially passed on the opportunity to establish 
whether or not gross negligence was sufficient to bring an employee’s 
claim within the intentional tort exception in U.S. Zinc. Co. v. Ross.128  
While attempting to remove ore that had become stuck in a rock crushing 
machine, the employee’s hand got stuck and was crushed.129  The court 
determined it was unnecessary to decide whether, in the abstract, 
negligently failing to safeguard such a machine could constitute “such gross 
negligence to amount to a willful and intentional injury inflicted by the 
employer.”130  Even if possible, the facts at bar were insufficient to 
establish such a claim.131  Accordingly, the court held that the employee’s 
claim was barred.132 
The court explained, “[t]he willfulness contemplated amounts to more 
than a mere act of the will, and carries with it the idea of premeditation, 
obstinacy, and intentional wrongdoing.”133  Among other shortcomings, the 
                                                                                                                 
barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity provision because the injury was not 
accidental). 
 124. 684 P.2d 565 (Okla. Civ. App. 1984). 
 125. Id. at 566. 
 126. See id. at 567, 568, 570. 
 127. Id. at 568; see also Pursell, 786 P.2d 716. 
 128. 208 P. 805 (Okla. 1922). 
 129. Id. at 806. 
 130. Id. at 807. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See id. at 806. 
 133. Id. at 807 (quoting Wick v. Gunn, 169 P. 1087, 1090 (Okla. 1917)). 
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employee failed to adduce any evidence that covering the machine with an 
apron, as the employee contended the employer should have done, was 
legally required, customary in the industry, or even practicable.134  Were 
these standard allegations of negligence sufficient to constitute a willful and 
intentional injury, the act would prove null “because every injury could be 
defined to be a willful and intentional injury.”135   
In Harrington v. Certified Systems, Inc., an Oklahoma court directly 
addressed for the first time the requisite standard of intent necessary to 
bring an employee’s claim within the intentional tort exception.136  The 
court concluded that in all Oklahoma cases applying the intentional tort 
exception, the court had decided whether the conduct at issue constituted an 
intentional tort without ever clearly defining what constituted an intentional 
tort in the first place.137  The court explained that intent requires “knowing 
and purposeful conduct on the part of the employer to injure the 
employee.”138  
The Oklahoma Supreme Court noted the jurisdictional split regarding the 
standard of intent—purpose versus substantial certainty—necessary to 
bring an employer’s conduct within the intentional tort exception to 
workers’ compensation exclusivity in Davis v. CMS Continental Natural 
Gas, Inc.139  Because the employee conceded the employer’s conduct was 
neither willful nor wanton (states of mind less culpable than either 
competing standard of intent), the Supreme Court determined it was 
unnecessary to resolve the issue of which standard to adopt in Oklahoma, as 
the employee’s claim was insufficient to satisfy either standard. 140 
B. Parret v. UNICCO Service Co. 
In Parret v. UNICCO Service Co., the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
determined an employee’s claim would fall outside of the exclusive remedy 
provisions of workers’ compensation if the injuries were the result of 
                                                                                                                 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.  
 136. 45 P.3d 430 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001). 
 137. Id. at 434. 
 138. Id. at 435 (emphasis added).  The Court, however, did not rely on this higher 
standard in barring the employee’s claim.  The court noted that the facts in this case were not 
sufficient to constitute an intentional tort under even the more liberal substantial certainty 
standard.  Id. at 436. 
 139. 23 P.3d 288, 294 (Okla. 2001). 
 140. See id. at 290, 291 n.6. 
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actions the employer knew were substantially certain to cause injury.141  By 
doing so, it chose to incorporate the broader of the two standards of intent 
in applying the intentional tort exception to workers’ compensation 
exclusivity.142 
1. Facts and Procedural History 
Parret was electrocuted at a tire plant replacing emergency lights while 
on the job.143  He died from his injuries two days later.144  Parret’s employer 
knew of the danger to its employees in working on the emergency lights 
while they were still energized—that is, without first cutting off the 
electricity to the light system as Parret was doing when he was fatally 
injured.145  The employer even “had written policies prohibiting employees 
from working on energized equipment” but apparently allowed the 
employees to continue working on the emergency lights knowing it was 
unsafe.146  
After Parret’s death, his widow brought a case in tort against Parret’s 
employer, UNICCO.  The Federal District Court for the Western District of 
Oklahoma, where the action was pending, certified the following question 
to the Oklahoma Supreme Court:  “What is the standard of intent necessary 
for an employee’s tort claim against an employer to fall outside the 
protection of the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Act?  Is the standard 
the ‘true intentional tort’ test, requiring deliberate specific intent to cause 
injury, or is the standard the ‘substantial certainty’ test?”147  The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court determined the requisite standard of intent:  “the employer 
must have (1) desired to bring about the worker’s injury or (2) acted with 
                                                                                                                 
 141. Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 574 (Okla. 2005), superseded by 
statute, 2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 2032-33.  Also at issue was “the test for determining 
statutory employer status.”  However, this issue is not addressed since it is not relevant to 
this Note. 
 142. Id. at 579.  The Parret court explained that the substantial certainty standard is not 
meant to expand the narrow intentional tort exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity.  
Instead, the substantial certainty test reflects the court’s “refusal to apply a stricter standard 
of intent to a worker’s tort claim against the employer than the Restatement standard of 
intent which would be applied to any other intentional tort.”  Id. 
 143. Id. at 574. 
 144. Id.  This note will not address Justice Opala’s argument that plaintiff’s suit should 
have been barred as a result of plaintiff’s earlier selection of the compensation remedy which 
she prosecuted to a successful conclusion. 
 145. See id. at 574.  
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 573. 
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the knowledge that such injury was substantially certain to result from the 
employer’s conduct.”148   
2. The Majority Opinion of Justice Colbert 
In describing the substantial certainty standard, the court stated that to 
act with knowledge of a substantial certainty of impending injury, the 
employer must intend “the act that caused the injury with knowledge that 
the injury was substantially certain to follow.”149  The court determined it 
was not sufficient that the injury was objectively substantially certain to 
occur.150  Instead, the plaintiff must demonstrate, often through 
circumstantial evidence, that the employer subjectively appreciated the 
substantial certainty of the impending injury.151  This subjective 
appreciation may be “inferred from the employer’s conduct and all the 
surrounding circumstances.”152 
The court noted that the plaintiff bears a heavy burden in demonstrating 
an employer’s knowledge of the substantial certainty of an injury.  The 
plaintiff does not carry his burden by demonstrating knowledge of 
foreseeable risk, high probability, or even substantial likelihood.153  To be 
sure, “[n]othing short of the employer’s knowledge of the ‘substantial 
certainty’ of injury will remove the injured worker’s claim from the 
exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Compensation Act.”154 
The court advanced several policy reasons for adopting the substantial 
certainty standard including:  
(1) the substantial certainty standard is consistent with the traditional 
definition of intent in torts;155  
                                                                                                                 
 148. Id. at 579. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. 
 155. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965)).  The Restatement, 
for example, uses the term “intent” to refer to instances in which the actor “desires to cause 
consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to 
result from it.”  Id. at 577.  Intent is not exclusively used throughout the Restatement to refer 
to desired consequences.  Instead, “[i]f the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or 
substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if 
he had in fact desired to produce the result.”  Id.  
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(2) the substantial certainty standard of intent preserves the proper 
balance of interests achieved in the industrial bargain between employees 
and employers;156 and  
(3) the substantial certainty standard promotes workplace safety.157  
Finally, the court acknowledged two primary concerns with employing 
the substantial certainty standard:  (1) that there is potential for confusion in 
applying the standard and (2) the standard could open the floodgates of 
litigation.158  In the majority’s view, however, neither concern proved 
significant enough to warrant the adoption of the contending “true intent” 
standard.159  With respect to the first concern, the majority felt that 
confusion in applying the standard could be avoided as the court had 
meticulously outlined what a plaintiff must show in order to meet the 
burden of demonstrating that the employer was substantially certain that an 
injury would result.160  As to the concern over proliferation of lawsuits, the 
majority thought that this result was not likely to obtain in Oklahoma since 
“in most instances, the predicted flood of litigation has not occurred, mainly 
because the courts, undoubtedly conscious of the dangers, have been quite 
                                                                                                                 
 156. See id. at 578.  The Oklahoma workers’ compensation statute provides many 
exceptions to workers’ compensation coverage for the employee’s willful misconduct, 
including “(1) willful injury to self or another, (2) failure to use a guard or protection 
furnished against accident, (3) substance abuse, or (4) horseplay.”  Id.  To preserve this 
delicate balance, in light of these exceptions “which favor the employer . . . a less stringent 
standard than ‘specific intent’ [should] be applied in determining whether an employee may 
recover damages, as opposed to benefits, as a result of the employer’s intentional 
misconduct.”  Id.  The substantial certainty standard achieves this balance “by emphasizing 
employees’ interest in protection from employer misconduct while maintaining employers’ 
fixed liability for all but intentional workplace injuries.”  Id. 
 157. Id.  Even when an employer does not desire, or specifically intend, to cause injury to 
an employee, at times the employer “certainly takes a calculated risk with their lives and 
safety—and perhaps takes all the greater risk because the employer knows that when injury 
inevitably does occur, the cost will be less because of the exclusive remedy and limited 
compensation provisions of the workers’ compensation.”  Id.  In these situations, applying 
the true intentional tort standard “allows employers to injure and even kill employees and 
suffer only workers’ compensation damages so long as the employer did not specifically 
intend to hurt the worker.”  Id.  Along similar lines, the Parret court explained that the 
substantial certainty test “furthers the general tort principle that injuries are to be 
compensated and antisocial behavior is to be discouraged.”  Id. at 579. 
 158. See id. at 578-79, 79 n.3. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 572. 
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conservative about allowing these kind of exceptions to exclusivity.  Most 
have been careful to limit use to the most egregious cases.”161 
3. Justice Winchester, with Whom Justices Lavender and Opala Join, 
Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part 
Instead of adopting the substantial certainty standard, Justices 
Winchester, Lavender, and Opala would have adopted the true intent 
standard.162  The dissent authored by Justice Winchester reasoned, in part: 
(1) the Oklahoma legislature established the workers’ compensation 
system and its separate court system specifically to address work-related 
injuries;163   
(2) the Oklahoma’s Workers’ Compensation Act represents a mutual 
compromise, reflecting on the industrial bargain reached between 
employers and employees:164  
(3) since “the express words of the Legislature provide balance to 
competing interests . . . the Legislature intended all but the most egregious 
circumstances to be covered by this statutory remedy;”165 and  
(4) [t]he standard set for such cases must be clear, concise and easily 
ascertainable and only the ‘true intentional tort’ test provides such an 
objective standard.”166   
4. Justice Opala, with Whom Justice Winchester Joins, Dissenting in 
Part 
Justice Opala stated that instead of adopting the “foreign doctrine of 
‘substantial certainty,’ the court should respect the parameters that have 
confined the intentional tort exception “for nearly a century—at the willful 
tort line.”167  Justice Opala was concerned that the substantial certainty 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Id. at 579 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 6 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX 
K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 103.04[4] (Matthew Bender 
2004)). 
 162. Id. at 581 (Winchester, V.C.J., dissenting). 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id.  
 167. Id. at 583 (Opala, J., dissenting).  Note that in Justice Opala’s view, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court should not address the certified question of what intent standard should 
apply to avoid workers’ compensation exclusivity without further assurances from the 
certifying court that plaintiff’s tort claim was not barred by issue preclusion since Parret had 
elected to receive workers’ compensation death benefits and the order in the workers’ 
compensation matter stated that the injury was accidental.  Id.  
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standard subjects employers to tort liability for torts of gross negligence and 
recklessness.168 
Justice Opala recounted the industrial bargain between employees and 
employers in which the employee gave up the right to common law tort 
suits based upon the employer’s negligence and the employer gave up its 
corresponding defenses including contributory negligence.169  Justice Opala 
observed that the employer maintains the defense of contributory 
negligence against employee tort claims premised on employer 
recklessness.170  Justice Opala concluded that the standard of intent should 
be set “at the demarcation that separates torts in which contributory 
negligence is a defense from torts in which contributory negligence is not a 
defense”—that is at the willful tort line.171   
5. Continuation in Trial Court After Oklahoma Supreme Court 
Determined the Substantial Certainly Standard Applied   
After the Oklahoma Supreme Court answered the question posed by the 
trial court and adopted the substantial certainty standard, Parret’s employer 
filed a motion for summary judgment in the trial court. The employer 
asserted Parret could not meet his burden under the substantial certainty 
test.172  The trial court first addressed whether Parret’s tort claim was barred 
by issue preclusion.173  It found Parret’s claim was not barred even though 
Parret’s widow received death benefits through workers’ compensation.174   
The trial court then looked to the evidence.  There was evidence 
presented “that UNICCO knew that there were no current electrical prints 
or lockout/tagout procedures for the emergency lighting system in the 
warehouse area” where Parret was working and that “UNICCO employees 
                                                                                                                 
 168. Id.  
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 584. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., No. CIV-01-1432-HE, 2006 WL 752877, at *1, *2 
(W.D. Okla. Mar. 21, 2006) (“The record before the court does not demonstrate that the 
nature of the decedent’s injury, as relevant to the present inquiry, was ‘actually litigated.’  
Whether the injury was ‘accidental’ from the standpoint of the employee, which was the 
issue in the workers' compensation proceeding, is not the same question as whether the 
employer's conduct was ‘intentional’ within the meaning of the exclusivity exception.  There 
is no suggestion here that the nature of the employer’s conduct was decided or even 
addressed in the proceeding. Under these circumstances, the doctrine of issue preclusion 
does not apply to bar the plaintiff’s claim.”). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
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did not know how to disconnect the power to the lights without serious 
adverse consequences.”175  The record also reflected that a few months 
before Parret was killed, another employee was electrically shocked and his 
hand badly burned “while working on a similar voltage lighting system.”176  
More importantly, evidence had been “submitted that UNICCO supervisors 
not only were aware that employees worked on the emergency lighting 
system ‘hot,’ but directed them to do so.”177  There was also “evidence that 
several employees refused to work on the emergency lights because they 
could not be de-energized, but that UNICCO supervisors would then, on 
occasion, direct the same work order to other employees.”178 
Analyzing the evidence in the light most favorable to Parret, the trial 
court denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment stating: 
The court concludes the evidence identified above, combined 
with other evidence in the record, is sufficient to create a triable 
issue and to warrant submission of the plaintiff's intentional tort 
claim against UNICCO to a jury.  The question is close because 
of the very narrow nature of the intentional tort exception to the 
exclusive remedy rule.  The “substantial certainty” test 
announced by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Parret is a high 
standard and will rarely be met.  Nonetheless, in the 
circumstances existing here, the court concludes the plaintiff's 
claim against UNICCO is supported by evidence which, when 
taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, is sufficient to 
create a triable issue of fact as to whether that admittedly 
stringent standard has been satisfied.179 
It is interesting to note that after the employer’s motion for summary 
judgment was denied, the Parret case did not go to trial. 
C. The Effect of Parret:  A Survey of Post-Parret Decisions 
Oklahoma’s adoption of the substantial certainty standard produced three 
related effects.  First, the substantial certainty standard liberalized the 
requirements an employee must satisfy to proceed in tort—that is withstand 
a motion for summary judgment—against an employer.  Second, adopting 
the substantial certainty standard affected when an employee may recover 
                                                                                                                 
 175. Id. at *4. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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in tort against an employer.  Third, adopting the substantial certainty 
standard affected the scope of employers’ liability insurance. 
The first effect of the substantial certainty standard was seen in the 
denial of summary judgment in Baggett v. Yaffe Companies, Inc.180  In 
Baggett, part of the employer’s business included the decommissioning of 
artillery shells.181  At least one employee refused to work on one of these 
shells after a supervisor “observed flammable gases, melting substances and 
tan liquid explosive pour out of the shells.”182  The employer was alerted of 
these dangers.183   
The employer then assigned a twenty-four-year-old temporary employee 
to work on the shells.184  The employee, unaware of any dangers, cut into 
the shell as instructed using a hand-held acetylene torch.185  The shell 
exploded and, after spending two weeks in the intensive care unit, the 
employee died.186 
The employee’s estate filed suit, alleging the employer was aware of the 
substantial certainty of injury to the employee.187  The plaintiffs alleged the 
employer instructed the employee to engage in unreasonably dangerous 
conduct all for opportunity to recover a dollar’s worth of brass and steel 
from the shell.188 
Had Oklahoma adopted the purpose to injure standard, the court likely 
would have granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment, as the 
plaintiffs conceded that the employer was motivated by the desire to 
recover the value of the brass and steel, not to injure the employee.189  
Instead, applying the substantial certainty standard, the court denied the 
employer’s motion for summary judgment, finding a genuine issue of 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Order at 3, Baggett v. Yaffe Cos., No. CJ-2009-87 (Leflore Cnty., Okla. May 10, 
2010). 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. at 2. 
 183. See id. 
 184. See id. 
 185. See id. at 1-3. 
 186. See id. at 3. 
 187. See Plaintiff’s Response In Chief to Yaffe Cos. & Yaffe Iron & Metal Corp.’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 10, Baggett v. Yaffe Cos., No. CJ-2009-87 (Leflore Cnty., 
Okla. Nov. 16, 2009). 
 188. See id. at 1. 
 189. See Davis v. U.S. Emp’rs Council, Inc, 934 P.2d 1142, 1146 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) 
(applying the purpose to injure standard, the court barred an employee’s claim despite the 
employer’s actual knowledge of certain injury because the employee conceded the employer 
was motivated by a desire to save money).  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
98 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:75 
 
 
material fact existed as to whether the employer was substantially certain 
the employee would be injured.190 
Second, the substantial certainty standard affected when an employee 
may recover in tort against an employer.  In Price v. Howard,191 an 
employee was killed in a plane crash.192  His wife sued, alleging the 
employer was substantially certain the employee would be injured during 
the flight.193 
The airplane, carrying passengers in violation of flight restrictions and 
cargo in excess of weight restrictions, took off in a turbulent rain storm the 
night of the crash.194  The plane had been modified to include an 
experimental five-bladed propeller and fuel tanks.195 
The court barred the wife’s claim, holding that the alleged facts did not 
satisfy the substantial certainty standard.196  The court emphasized the 
substantial certainty standard “presents a formidable barrier to recovery in 
tort.”197 
Canvassing the record, the court noted that other aircraft utilizing the 
experimental five-bladed propeller had made successful flights before and 
that this specific aircraft had flown with the experimental propeller between 
twenty and thirty hours without incident; however, “the plane had not flown 
with the additional tanks fueled.”198  The court was also persuaded by the 
lack of evidence indicating that any of the passengers of the plane 
“appreciated the risk or were intent on committing suicide by boarding the 
plane for takeoff.”199  
The court was aware that taking off in a rainstorm with cargo in excess 
of 1,000 pounds over the plane’s weight limit “substantially increased the 
likelihood that complications could occur.”200  Although it concluded that 
allowing the plane to take flight under the stated conditions was reckless, 
recklessness alone is insufficient to bring a claim within the intentional tort 
exception.201  Similarly, the violation of safety regulations, “even if wilful 
                                                                                                                 
 190. Order, supra note 180, at 3. 
 191. 236 P.3d 82 (Okla. 2010). 
 192. Id. at 86. 
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. at 85-86. 
 195. Id. at 86. 
 196. Id. at 90. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 88-89. 
 199. Id. at 90. 
 200. Id. at 89-90 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 201. See id. at 90. 
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and knowing, does not rise to the level of an intentional tort or an actual 
intent to injure.”202 
Third, the substantial certainty standard affected the scope of employers’ 
liability insurance.  Where an employer’s liability insurance excludes 
liability predicated on the employer’s intentional misconduct, the more 
liberal substantial certainty standard has the effect of broadening the 
coverage exclusion.  The result is that an employer, shielded from liability 
under the more restrictive purpose standard, may be surprised to find that 
the insurance does not cover certain conduct under the substantial certainty 
standard.203 
In CompSource Oklahoma v. L & L Construction, Inc., an employee, 
while working in a confined space, was overcome by hydrogen sulfide—a 
gas that the employer allegedly knew or should have known was fatally 
toxic and a common byproduct of the employer’s line of business.204  The 
employee then lost consciousness, fell, violently struck his head, and 
ultimately died a few hours later.205 
The employee’s estate filed a tort claim against the employer, alleging 
that injury to the employee was substantially certain to result from the 
employer’s failure “to properly educate, train and protect decedent in 
conjunction with its knowledge of the lethal properties of hydrogen sulfide 
gases and decedent’s exposure to them.”206   
The issue before the court involved the contract between the employer 
and CompSource.  In its contract with L & L Construction, CompSource 
agreed to indemnify, defend, and compensate the employer against and for 
workers’ compensation claims.207  The policy provided an exclusion for 
“bodily injury intentionally caused or aggravated by [the employer].”208  
Relying on this provision and Oklahoma’s recent standard of intent set forth 
in Parret, CompSource sought declaratory judgment to establish 
CompSource did not have a duty to defend or compensate the employer.209 
The court ruled in favor of CompSource, holding that CompSource owed 
no duty to the insured employer as the policy specifically excludes 
                                                                                                                 
 202. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 203. See, e.g., CompSource Okla. v. L & L Constr., Inc., 207 P.3d 415 (Okla. Civ. App. 
2009).  
 204. Id. at 417. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 207. See id. at 416. 
 208. Id. at 418 (emphasis added). 
 209. See id. at 416-17. 
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intentional torts.210  The court explained that in Parret, the Supreme Court 
of Oklahoma had “clarified what kind of conduct constituted an intentional 
tort.”211  An employee’s claim satisfies the requisite intent standard if the 
employee shows that the employer “(1) desired to bring about the worker’s 
injury, or (2) acted with the knowledge that such injury was substantially 
certain to result.”212  Although declining to assess the sufficiency of 
CompSource’s underlying petition, the court held, “it is enough that [the 
employee] has attempted to allege an intentional tort under the Workers 
Compensation Act so as to avoid the exclusive remedy provision.”213   
D. The 2010 Amendments to Oklahoma Worker’s Compensation Act:  Title 
85, Section 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes 
The Oklahoma legislature, in adopting the 2010 amendments to workers’ 
compensation, effectively overturned Parret and adopted the purpose to 
injure standard.214  The amended exclusivity provision now provides that 
workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy for an injured employee 
“except in the case of an intentional tort, or where the employer has failed 
to secure the payment of compensation for the injured employee.”215  The 
statute explicitly states that an intentional tort “exist[s] only when the 
employee is injured as a result of willful, deliberate, specific intent of the 
employer to cause such injury.”216  A plaintiff’s successful demonstration 
that the employer had” knowledge that such injury was substantially certain 
to result from [its] conduct”217 is insufficient to establish an intentional tort 
for purposes of the exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity.218 
  
                                                                                                                 
 210. See id. at 420-21. 
 211. Id. at 420. 
 212. Id. at 420-21 (quoting Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 579 (Okla. 2005), 
superseded by statute, 2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 2032-33). 
 213. Id. at 421. 
 214. See 85 OKLA. STAT. § 302 (2011); Parret, 127 P.3d at 579. 
 215. 85 OKLA. STAT. § 302.  The statute also provides an exception to exclusivity “where 
the employer has failed to secure the payment of compensation for the injured employee”.  
Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Parret, 127 P.3d at 579. 
 218. See 85 OKLA. STAT. § 302. 
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V. Purpose to Injure Is the Appropriate Standard to Define the Scope of the 
Intentional Tort Exception to Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity 
The Oklahoma Legislature adopted the proper standard of intent—
purpose to injure—for defining the parameters of the intentional tort 
exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity.  
A. Purpose to Cause Injury Is Consistent with the Majority of Jurisdictions 
Oklahoma has joined the majority of states in adopting the true intent 
standard.219  Today, all but nine states recognize an exception to workers’ 
compensation exclusivity for an employer’s intentional torts.220  Of the 
states that do provide such an exception, slightly more than twenty states 
expressly have adopted the purpose to injure standard.221  Approximately 
eight other states have adopted a similar or slightly more restrictive 
formulation of the purpose to injure standard.222  The remaining minority of 
roughly ten states have adopted the substantial certainty standard.223   
 While the mere fact that the majority of legislatures have adopted a 
similar standard does not in itself warrant the adoption of the same in 
Oklahoma.  Nonetheless, it indicates that other legislatures in weighing the 
competing interests of employees and employers involved in setting the 
standard of intent have determined that the purpose to injure standard is 
more consistent with workers’ compensation policy. 
Adopting the majority standard in Oklahoma is also important for 
Oklahoma business.  If Oklahoma adopted the less exacting minority 
substantial certainty standard, employers may be discouraged from 
operating their businesses in Oklahoma when instead they could operate in 
nearby states such as Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, and Missouri that apply 
a more exacting standard.224 
  
                                                                                                                 
 219. See Appendix; see also King v. Penrod Drilling Co., 652 F. Supp. 1331, 1334 (D. 
Nev. 1987). 
 220. See Appendix (stating that Kansas, Maine, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Wisconsin and Wyoming do not currently allow an exception to 
exclusivity for an employer’s intentional conduct). 
 221. See id. 
 222. See id. 
 223. See id.; Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 575 (Okla. 2005), superseded 
by statute, 2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 2032-33. 
 224. See Appendix. 
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B. The Purpose to Cause Injury Standard Is a Bright Line Rule 
An employer acts with “purpose” to cause injury if, and only if, it is his 
conscious object to cause such injury.225  As a result, an employer harboring 
any motive other than a desire to injure the employee does not act with 
purpose.226  This holds true irrespective of the employer’s awareness of the 
certainty of the employee’s injury.227 
In stark contrast to the bright line rule, the substantial certainty standard 
depends upon subtle gradations of knowledge that include knowledge of 
foreseeable risk, substantial likelihood of risk, substantial certainty of risk, 
and virtual certainty of risk.  The Supreme Court of Michigan criticized the 
standard, noting:   
The problem with the substantial certainty test is that it is 
difficult to draw the line between substantial certainty and 
substantial risk.  In applying the substantial certainty test, some 
courts have confused intentional, reckless, and even negligent 
misconduct, and therefore blurred the line between intentional 
and accidental injuries.  The true intentional tort standard 
[should] keep the distinction clear.228 
Part of the reason that the substantial certainty standard is confusing is 
that it is inconsistent with the common use of the word “intent.”  The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland noted that intent “is the word commonly used to 
describe the purpose to bring about stated physical consequences.”229  
Because the substantial certainty standard is inconsistent with the common 
understanding of intent, “any serious application of the [standard] . . . 
requires us to engage in strange verbal contortions.”230  The substantial 
certainty standard, 
                                                                                                                 
 225. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (2011). 
 226. See Davis v. U.S. Emp’rs Council, Inc., 934 P.2d 1142, 1146 (Or. Ct. App. 1997). 
 227. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 1 cmt. c (2010). 
 228. Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 398 N.W.2d 882, 893 (Mich. 1986) (footnote 
omitted), superseded by statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.131 (West Supp. 2011) 
(providing that the exception to exclusivity is satisfied only when an “employer specifically 
intended an injury”). 
 229. Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., 503 A.2d 708, 712 (Md. 1986) 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 (W. Page 
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984)). 
 230. Anthony Sebok, Purpose, Belief, and Recklessness:  Pruning the Restatement 
(Third)’s Definition of Intent, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1165, 1173 (2001). 
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like Voltaire's God, seems to have been invented out of 
necessity, since it resembles no intuitively familiar mental state 
and is famously difficult to explain to skeptical first year 
students who have not yet checked their common sense at the 
law school's front door. It is something less than certainty (which 
would be too strong) and more than highly probable (which 
would be too weak, and would collapse the whole category into 
recklessness). It is a concept, which, having no fixed meaning, 
can, as the workman's compensation cases discussed above 
show, mean whatever a judge wants.231 
The Parret court thought its careful articulation of the substantial 
certainty standard would prevent the newly adopted standard from opening 
the floodgates of litigation.  But, the standard has proven to be both difficult 
to apply and fact intensive.  Even after the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
required the use of the substantial certainty test, the trial court in Parret 
refused to grant the employer’s motion for summary judgment.232  Many 
other tort cases involving employee injury were filed outside of the workers 
compensation arena and similarly survived motions for summary judgment. 
The difficulty in applying the standard is illustrated in a recent 
unreported decision in Oklahoma wherein the court, discussing the 
substantial certainty test, found “it interesting that the ‘substantial certainty’ 
standard as adopted in this case is closely akin to the standards established 
for ‘willful and wanton’ misconduct as described by Professor Prosser in 
his treatise on torts.”233  The court explained that for an employer’s conduct 
to be willful or wanton, the employer need not intend to cause injury.234  
Instead, it is sufficient that the employer act “in total disregard of the 
consequences and under such circumstances that a reasonable man would 
know or have reason to know that such conduct would be likely to result in 
substantial harm to another.”235   
The requisite intent for willful and wanton conduct differs from 
substantial certainty described in Parret because it requires only that the 
injury be “likely” to occur as opposed to being substantially certain to 
                                                                                                                 
 231. Id.  
 232. See Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., No. CIV-01-1432-HE, 2006 WL 752877, at *4 
(W.D. Okla. Mar. 21, 2006). 
 233. Order, supra note 180, at 2. 
 234. Id. at 2-3 (citing Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342 (Okla. 1993)). 
 235. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
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occur.236  The court’s recognition of standard similarity, even after the 
Parret court’s painstaking efforts to distinguish the substantial certainty 
standard from less culpable states of mind, highlights the difficultly courts 
across the country have had in applying the standard.   
C. The Purpose to Cause Injury Standard Avoids Litigation in All but the 
Most Egregious of Situations 
An employee’s tort claim, in a jurisdiction applying the purpose to injure 
standard, will be barred in all but the most egregious of cases.237  An 
employee’s tort claim in a jurisdiction applying the substantial certainty 
standard, however, will likely survive an employer’s motion for summary 
judgment even if based upon factual allegations sufficient to satisfy only 
the recklessness standard.  Requiring juries to resolve these grey area cases, 
ranging from recklessness to certainty of injury, creates uncertainty both in 
terms of the existence and extent of employer liability.  This uncertainty 
threatens to unsettle the balance of the interests reflected in the industrial 
bargain which provides employers with definite yet limited liability and 
employees with automatic yet limited recovery.   
As with any claim, once the standard is established, the underlying facts 
of the claim must be applied to the requisite standard.  In the workers’ 
compensation context, not only is the substantial certainty standard itself 
imprecise and confusing, but the facts introduce their own complexities, 
given that the dispositive issue is the degree of the employer’s subjective 
appreciation of a known risk.   
Due to the importance of subtle fact variations in each case, appellate 
courts across various jurisdictions have overturned trial courts’ grants of 
summary judgment in favor of the employer, holding that whether the 
employer’s alleged conduct was sufficient to constitute knowledge of a 
substantial certainty of injury presented an issue of material fact that must 
be resolved by the jury.238  
For example, in O’Brien v. Ottawa Silica Co., an employee contracted 
respiratory disease from exposure to asbestos.239  Company doctors 
                                                                                                                 
 236. See id; Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 579 (Okla. 2005), superseded by 
statute, 2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 2032-33. 
 237. Parret, 127 P.3d at 575 (quoting 48 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 2 (1987)) (“[I]n 
any jurisdiction applying the ‘specific intent’ standard, ‘unless the case involves an assault 
or a battery, recovery will probably be denied.’”). 
 238. See, e.g., Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 639 A.2d 507, 508, 513 (Conn. 1994) 
(noting cases in which other appellate courts have made similar holdings). 
 239. 656 F. Supp. 610, 611 (E.D. Mich. 1987). 
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recommended that the employer take precautionary measures to protect the 
employee.240  The employer, however, not only failed to implement these 
precautionary measures, but also withheld the doctors’ finding of calcified 
plaques in the employee’s lungs, effectively precluding the employee from 
seeking early medical treatment.241  The court reasoned, “[i]f proven, these 
facts might permit an inference that [the employer] knew injury to [the 
employee] was substantially certain to occur.”242 
Likewise, in Kielwein v. Gulf Nuclear, Inc., when the employer directed 
the employee to clean up a radiation spill while denying the employee 
access to safety materials, the court held that an issue of material fact 
existed as to whether the employer was substantially certain injury would 
result.243  
Similarly in Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., an employee’s fingers 
were partially amputated when his fingers got stuck in a plastic molding 
machine while the employee was “attempting to clear hot molten plastic out 
of . . . [the] machine.”244  The employee alleged that injury resulted from 
the employer’s “wilful and serious misconduct.”245  More specifically, the 
defendant alleged the employer:  (1) required employees to clear the 
machine while the machine was in use; (2) denied employees access to 
safer methods; and (3) failed to install a protective covering over the 
machine to mitigate the likelihood of injury.246  The appellate court reversed 
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer, 
finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the 
employer was substantially certain that injury would result.247 
The employer, in each of the cases, was aware that the employer’s 
conduct created some degree of risk of injury to the employee.248  In these 
                                                                                                                 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. 783 S.W.2d 746, 747-48 (Tex. App. 1990). 
 244. 639 A.2d 507, 508 (Conn. 1994). 
 245. Id.  
 246. Id. 
 247. See id. at 508, 513 (“Here, a jury could reasonably infer, from all the circumstances 
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, that the defendant's conduct constituted 
more than a mere failure to provide appropriate safety or protective measures, and that the 
plaintiff's injury was the inevitable and known result of the actions required of him by the 
defendant.”). 
 248. See O'Brien v. Ottawa Silica Co., 656 F. Supp. 610, 611 (E.D. Mich. 1987) 
(employer withheld from employee a physician’s report indicating the employee had 
calcified plaques in his lung); Suarez, 639 A.2d 507, 509 (Conn. 1994) (employer’s conduct 
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cases, the only issue remaining for the juries to resolve was how aware the 
employers were of the likelihood of injury to the employee.  If the employer 
was substantially certain of the risk of injury, the employee’s claim would 
fall within the intentional tort exception and the claim would not be barred 
by the exclusivity provision.  If, on the other hand, the employer was only 
aware of the substantial likelihood of injury or was reckless with respect to 
the likelihood of injury, the employee’s claim does not satisfy the 
intentional tort exception and the claim will be barred. 
Although courts have attempted to clearly define the substantial certainty 
standard, as O’Brien, Kielwein, and Suarez demonstrate, employers’ 
motions for summary judgment in all but the most basic negligence claims 
will be denied.  Thus, while only conduct rising to the level of substantial 
certainty is sufficient to establish liability, many claims ultimately 
amounting to mere recklessness must survive summary judgment so that the 
jury can make that determination.  Since employee claims premised on 
employer recklessness must survive summary judgment, employers must 
either defend against or settle claims that under the more exacting purpose 
to injure standard would be barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity.  
This substantial increase in litigation countermands the employer’s 
principal benefit of the industrial bargain—certain yet limited liability.  
D. The Purpose to Cause Injury Standard Is More Consistent with the No-
fault Principle of Workers’ Compensation 
Not only does the substantial certainty test require the trier of fact to 
assess the employer’s degree of awareness of risk, it also requires a 
determination of whether the employer was culpable as opposed to just 
whether the injury was work related.   
Even with the most precise definition by a state’s legislature or highest 
court, a jury may be unlikely to understand, let alone apply, a complex 
substantial certainty standard.  The jury may instead inappropriately 
associate egregious conduct or heinous injury with an employer’s 
knowledge of the substantial certainty of injury.  But, unlike tort, recovery 
in workers’ compensation depends not upon the egregiousness of the 
employer’s conduct but instead “depends on one simple test:  Was there a 
work-connected injury?”249  If so, the employee’s claim is generally 
                                                                                                                 
violated O.S.H.A. standards and other accepted safety standards); Kielwein, 783 S.W.2d at 
748 (“It is impossible for [the employer] to have been unaware that exposing [the employee] 
to such risks without any protection whatsoever would be substantially certain to cause 
[injury].”). 
 249. 1 LARSON, supra note 16, § 1.03(1). 
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covered by workers’ compensation and therefore barred by exclusivity.  
Professor Larson explains: 
 Negligence, and, for the most part, fault, are not in issue and 
cannot affect the result.  Let the employer’s conduct be flawless 
in its perfection, and let the employee’s be abysmal in its 
clumsiness, rashness and ineptitude; if the accident arises out of 
and in the course of the employment, the employee receives an 
award.  Reverse the positions, with a careless and stupid 
employer and a wholly innocent employee and the same award 
issues.   
 Thus, the test is not the relation of an individual’s personal 
quality (fault) to an event, but the relationship of an event to an 
employment.  The essence of applying the test is not a matter of 
assessing blame, but of marking out boundaries.”250 
Allowing juries to determine whether an employer’s subjective 
knowledge satisfies an imprecise substantial certainty standard risks 
violating this fundamental principle that fault is largely immaterial in 
workers’ compensation.   
Having juries assess the degree of knowledge with which the employer 
acted in itself disregards this fundamental test for coverage of whether the 
injury was work related.  For example, in denying the employers’ motions 
for summary judgment in O’Brien, Kielwein, and Suarez, the courts held 
that the juries must determine the likelihood of injury of which the 
employers were aware. 
In all three cases, the employer engaged in egregious conduct.  In 
O’Brien, the employer concealed the existence of a medical condition from 
an employee effectively denying that employee the opportunity to seek 
medical treatment.251  In Kielwein, the employer exposed the employee to 
radiation yet denied the employee access to appropriate safety materials.252  
In Suarez, the employer violated OSHA requirements and other safety 
standards in failing to furnish an adequate guard to a plastic molding 
machine and in refusing to allow the employee to fulfill his work 
responsibilities in a safer fashion.253  Yet, in focusing upon the culpability 
of the employer, the courts in each of these cases failed to address the more 
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 252. Kielwein, 783 S.W.2d at 747. 
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relevant question of whether these injuries were work related and invited 
juries to make their factual determinations in reference to the culpability of 
the employer. 
In each case, the injuries were work related and therefore within the 
purview of workers’ compensation and its exclusivity.  In O’Brien, for 
example, the employee was exposed to asbestos in the workplace.254  The 
employee in Kielwein was exposed to radioactive isotopes while 
decontaminating an area following a radiation spill that occurred “when 
another employee accidentally sliced through a sealed capsule.”255  Finally, 
in Suarez, an employee sued his employer, Dickmont Plastics Corporation, 
when two of the employee’s fingers were permanently injured after his 
hand was caught in the plastic molding machine while the employee was 
attempting to remove “hot molten plastic” from the machine.256  Had the 
court applied the proper standard—whether there was a work related 
injury—the employees’ remedy in O’Brien, Kielwein, and Suarez would 
have been limited to that which is provided by workers’ compensation.257 
E. Tort Law and Its Underlying Policies Should Not Govern Recovery in 
Work Related Injuries 
Considering the different objectives of workers’ compensation and tort 
law, the legislature should assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
the two competing standards in relation to the unique objectives of workers’ 
compensation law rather than the objectives of tort law.  Professor Larson 
observed one of two mistakes responsible for virtually “every major error 
that can be observed in the development of compensation law, whether 
judicial or legislative, can be traced . . . to the importation of tort ideas.” 258  
A general understanding of the relationship between workers’ 
compensation, tort law, and social insurance proves fundamental to 
avoiding this mistake.259 
                                                                                                                 
 254. See O’Brien, 656 F. Supp. at 611. 
 255. Kielwein, 783 S.W.2d at 747. 
 256. Suarez, 639 A.2d at 508. 
 257. To be sure, the rationale behind the exception to exclusivity in jurisdictions that 
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Workers’ compensation “is neither a branch of tort law nor [a form of] 
social insurance;” however, workers’ compensation does exhibit some 
characteristics of each.260  Similar to tort, but unlike social insurance, 
liability for compensation rests solely with the employer. 261  Neither the 
employee nor the state contributes to the system from which benefits are 
disbursed. 262  On the other hand, similar to social insurance, but unlike tort, 
benefits are determined “based largely on a social theory of providing 
support and preventing destitution, rather than settling accounts between 
two individuals according to their personal deserts or blame.” 263 
To be clear, the substantial certainty standard is consistent with the 
standard of intent used throughout the Restatement (Second) of Torts for 
most intentional torts.264  Nevertheless, even tort law is now recognizing the 
importance of distinguishing between purpose and substantial certainty in a 
variety of contexts.  The Restatement (Third) of Torts, for example, 
distinguishes between the two standards in certain respects and 
acknowledges that “purpose [provides] a clearly stronger basis for 
liability.”265 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts goes even further, explicitly separating 
the two standards of intent and moving “what was once a mere 
comment”—the definition of intent—“to the most prominent position,” the 
first section.266  The Restatement (Third) of Torts summarizes the 
complexity and centrality of the definition of intent in a variety of legal 
contexts as follows:  
[w]hether an act is characterized as intentional, reckless, or 
negligent may determine whether punitive damages are 
available, whether contribution is permitted in comparative fault, 
whether a tort judgment will be dischargeable in bankruptcy, 
whether liability insurance will cover an insured's tortious 
conduct, whether a worker will be able to exit the workman's 
compensation system and sue her employer in tort, whether 
emotional distress will be available to a bystander, whether a 
municipality can be sued in tort, whether affirmative defenses 
                                                                                                                 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). 
 265. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 1 cmt. a (2010). 
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are available, and whether the statute of limitations applicable to 
a given action.267 
The Restatement (Third) separates the two competing standards of intent 
“to accommodate courts that in particular contexts might want to 
distinguish between intent in the sense of purpose and intent in the sense of 
knowledge.”268  Interestingly, the Restatement (Third) specifically identifies 
the struggle among state courts to define intent for purposes of the 
intentional tort exception to workers’ compensation as one of the primary 
factors motivating its separation of the two definitions of intent.269 
Despite important differences in policy objectives of tort law and 
compensation law and the Restatement (Third)’s recognition of the need to 
distinguish the two standards of intent, Parret relied heavily in its reasoning 
on adopting a standard of intent consistent with tort policies and 
terminology.270  The Parret court stated that the substantial certainty 
standard “furthers the general tort principle that injuries are to be 
compensated and anti-social behavior is to be discouraged.”271 
Although fully compensating injuries and deterring misconduct remain 
important policy objectives, these policies prove subordinate to other policy 
considerations in workers’ compensation law.   
As the Parret court observed, limiting an individual employee’s recovery 
to that provided by workers’ compensation will often deny the employee 
full and adequate compensation.  The Parret court failed to realize, 
however, that workers’ compensation law, unlike tort recovery, “does not 
pretend to restore to the claimant what he or she has lost; it gives claimant a 
sum which, added to his or her remaining earning ability, if any, will 
presumably enable claimant to exist without being a burden to others.”272 
It is important to remember that—unlike barring a claim for another 
reason, such as the running of the statute of limitations which has the effect 
of denying recovery entirely—barring an injured employee’s tort claim 
                                                                                                                 
 267. Id. at 1168. 
 268. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 
1 cmt. a (2010). 
 269. Id. 
 270. See Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 577 (Okla. 2005), superseded by 
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 272. 1 LARSON, supra note 16, § 1.03(5). 
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because of the exclusivity of workers’ compensation means only that the 
employee’s recovery will be limited to workers’ compensation benefits.  
Although these benefits are modest compared to potential tort damages, the 
legislature set the benefit levels to meet the basic needs of the employer and 
his dependents.273  The purposes of workers’ compensation “are best served 
by allowing th[is] remedial system which the Legislature has created a 
broad sphere of operation.”274  Courts should be wary not to disturb the 
balance the legislature has struck in determining that “the benefits derived 
from quick and certain basic compensation outweigh those from delayed 
and contingent full compensation.”275 
Additionally, the Parret court correctly observed that subjecting 
employers to tort liability would have substantial deterrent value.276  
Although the underlying employer conduct in many employee claims is 
reprehensible, workers’ compensation law is motivated by policy 
considerations other than deterring or punishing this conduct.  Unlike tort 
recovery, “[i]n compensation theory, liability is not supposed to hurt the 
employer as it helps the employee, since the loss is normally passed on to 
the consumer.”277  The ability of the employer to spread the cost of liability 
for claims covered by the act likely decreases the employer’s incentive to 
avoid the liability causing conduct.  The legislature, however, in 
promulgating the workers’ compensation system has determined that the 
benefits of certain and limited liability and automatic and certain recovery 
outweigh the costs of the diminution in deterrent effect. 
VI. Conclusion 
The choice between which of the competing standards of intent to apply 
to the intentional tort exception to workers’ compensation remains difficult 
                                                                                                                 
 273. See id.  
 274. Kittell v. Vt. Weatherboard, Inc., 417 A.2d 926, 927 (Vt. 1980). 
 275. Id. 
 276. Parret, 127 P.3d at 578.  In CompSource Oklahoma v. L & L Construction, Inc., the 
employer’s liability insurance carrier successfully denied coverage of an employee’s claim 
based upon a work related injury where the employee alleged the employer’s actions were 
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21 (Okla. Civ. App. 2009).  To the extent that substantial certainty has this effect, the 
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Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
112 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:75 
 
 
due to competing policy considerations that militate in favor of each 
standard. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Parret, weighing the competing 
interests of employers and employees, adopted the substantial certainty 
standard.  In its view, the substantial certainty standard satisfies the general 
purposes of workers’ compensation while simultaneously deterring 
intentional employer wrongdoing and promoting safety in the workplace.  
Subsequent to the Parret decision, the Oklahoma legislature, also weighing 
these policy considerations, adopted the stricter "purpose" standard.  
Considering overarching policies underlying workers’ compensation as a 
whole, including ensuring certain and limited liability, the Oklahoma 
Legislature adopted the proper standard.  In individual instances, however, 
the purpose standard will provide inadequate compensation to employees 
injured by at times egregious employer conduct.  The Parret court correctly 
identified that the challenging cases lie between the extremes of employer 
negligence and purposeful misconduct—“where the employer [is] . . . not 
motivated by a desire to harm employees, but certainly tak[es] a calculated 
risk with their lives and safety.”278  While those situations are likely rare, 
the newly adopted purpose standard will bar employee recovery against the 
employer in all but those situations where the employer purposefully 
injured its employee. 
   
Matthew K. Brown 
                                                                                                                 
 278. Parret, 127 P.3d at 578 (quoting 7 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 197, § 2, at 204). 
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State Approach Statute Case Law 






related to the 
employment 
relationship as 
to fall outside 
the coverage of 
workers' 
compensation, 
such as fraud 
and outrage. 
Ala. Code § 25-5-53 
(1975) (exclusive 
remedy). 
Raines v. Browning-Ferris Industries of 
Alabama, Inc., 638 So.2d 1334 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 1993) (providing an exception for 
"tortious conduct committed outside the 
course of the claimant's employment, such as 
fraud or outrage."); Ex parte Progress Rail 
Services Corp., 869 So.2d 459, 473 (Ala. 
2003) ("It certainly can be argued that the 
Legislature manifested an entirely different 
intent in 1992 when it completely rewrote § 
25-5-11 so as to specifically provide that 
various parties, exclusive of the employer, 
could be sued for willful conduct. The 
Legislature's so specifying as to various 
nonemployer parties, but providing no 
corresponding “limited” immunity for 
employers that would modify the “complete” 
immunity employers had previously been 
declared to enjoy, suggests that the Legislature 
intended to leave unaltered the nature of 
employer immunity."); Lowman v. Piedmont 
Executive Shirt Mfg. Co., 547 So.2d 90, 94 
(Ala. 1988) ("[T]he Act should not be an 
impervious barrier, insulating a wrongdoer 
from the payment of just and fair damages for 
intentional tortious acts only very tenuously 
related to workplace accidents.”). 
Alaska Purpose/Specific 
Intent (Judicial) 
Alaska Stat. § 
23.30.055 
(exclusive remedy). 
Van Biene v. Era Helicopters, Inc., 779 P.2d 
315, 319 (Alaska 1989)(requiring showing of 
"intent to harm by the employer" ; Fenner v. 
Municipality of Anchorage, 53 P.3d 573, 577-
78 (Alaska 2002)(finding no genuine issue of 
material fact when plaintiff failed to adduce 
evidence indicating defendant "specifically 




Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 23-1022(A)-




defined as "an act 
done knowingly and 
purposely with the 
direct object of 
injuring another." 
Johnson v. Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, Inc., 
631 P.2d 548, 552 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1981)(requiring showing of "deliberate 
intention [to inflict injury] as distinguished 
from some kind of intention presumed from 
gross negligence." 
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Guerrero v. OK Foods, Inc., 230 
S.W.3d 296, 298 (Ark. Ct. App. 
2006)(internal quotation 
omitted)("[T]he exception only 
applies to acts committed with an 
actual, specific, and deliberate intent 
on the part of the employer to injure 
the employee."). 
California 3 Statutory 
Exceptions 
Cal. Labor Code § 3602 
(exceptions to 
exclusivity for: (1) 
employer's "willful 
physical assault" (2) 
employer's "fraudulent 
concealment of the 
existence of the injury 
and its connection with 
the employment" (3) 
"employee's injury or 
death is proximately 
caused by a defective 
product manufactured 
by the employer and 
sold, leased, or 
otherwise transferred for 
valuable consideration 
to an independent third 
person, and that product 
is thereafter provided 
for the employee's use 
by a third person." 
Gunnell v. Metrocolor Laboratories, 
Inc., Cal. Rptr. 2d 195 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2001)(check cite and 
page)(framing inquiry as whether 
injury arose out of and in the course 
of employment rather than an 
inquiry as to "the state of knowledge 
of the employer and the employee 
regarding the dangerous condition 
which caused the injury."  
Colorado Purpose/Specific 
Intent (Judicial) 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-
102 (exclusive remedy). 
Schwindt v. Hershey Foods Corp., 
81 P.3d 1144, 1146-47 (Colo. App. 
2003) (rejecting outright the 
substantial certainty standard and 
holding that the exception applies 
only if "employer deliberately 




Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-
284(a) (year) (exclusive 
remedy). 
McClain v. Pfizer, Inc., 692 
F.Supp.2d 229, 243 (D.Conn., 2010) 
(quoting Suarez v. Dickmont 
Plastics Corp., 698 A.2d 838, 840-
841 (Conn. 1997) (“'[A] plaintiff 
employee [can] establish an 
intentional tort claim ... by proving 
either [(1)] that the employer 
actually intended to injure the 
plaintiff (actual intent standard) or 
[(2)] that the employer intentionally 
created a dangerous condition that 
made the plaintiff's injuries 
substantially certain to occur 
(substantial certainty standard).'”  
  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss1/3
2012] NOTES 115 
 
 
State Approach Statute Case Law 
Delaware Purpose/ 









Del. Code Ann. tit. 19 §§ 
2301, 2304  
Ward v. General Motors Corp., 
431 A.2d 1277, 1279 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 1981)(citing Del. Code Ann. 
Tit. 19 § 2301 and explaining that 
Delaware requires specific intent). 
Florida Virtually Certain 
(Statutory) 
Fla. Stat. § 440.11(1)(b) 
(the employee must 
prove, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that 
"1. The employer 
deliberately intended to 
injure the employee; or 2. 
The employer engaged in 
conduct that the employer 
knew, based on prior 
similar accidents or on 
explicit warnings 
specifically identifying a 
known danger, was 
virtually certain to result 
in injury or death to the 
employee, and the 
employee was not aware 
of the risk because the 
danger was not apparent 
and the employer 
deliberately concealed or 
misrepresented the 
danger so as to prevent 
the employee from 
exercising informed 
judgment about whether 
to perform the work. 
  
Jones v. Martin Electronics, Inc., 
932 So. 2d 1100, 1105 (Fla. 2006) 
(holding that the employee's claim 
is not barred by the exclusivity 
provision "if the employer's 
conduct is to the level of 
intentional conduct substantially 
certain to result in injury"). 




to the employment 
relationship; 




arises from the 
employment 
relationship, the 
claim is barred.  
Ga. Code Ann. § 34-9-
1(4)(Year)("'Injury' and 
'personal injury' shall not 
include injury caused by 
the willful act of a third 
person directed against an 
employee for reasons 
personal to such 
employee;" therefore, 
claims arising from such 
actions are not covered 
by the statute and are 
accordingly not barred by 
the exclusivity 
provision.). 
Baldwin v. Roberts, 442 S.E.2d 
272, 273-74 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) 
(holding employee's claim against 
employer for battery when 
employer struck employee as 
employee was being escorted 
from restaurant by police was 
barred because alleged battery 
was related to employment and 
therefore covered by the 
exclusivity provision of workers' 
compensation.) See also 12 Ga. 
Jur. Workers' Compensation § 4:6 
Purely Personal Willful and 
Intentional Acts. 
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State Approach Statute Case Law 
Hawaii Exception limited 





privacy related to 
sexual harassment 
or sexual assault, 




Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-5 
(Year) (providing 
exclusive remedy "except 
for sexual harassment or 
sexual assault and 
infliction of emotional 
distress or invasion of 
privacy related thereto, in 
which case a civil action 
may also be brought"). 
Kamaka v. Goodsill Anderson 
Quinn & Stifel, 176 P.3d 91, 108 
(Haw. 2008) ("Based on a plain 
reading, HRS § 386-5 
unambiguously provides that 
claims for infliction of emotional 
distress or invasion of privacy are 
not subject to the exclusivity 
provision when such claims arise 
from claims for sexual harassment 
or sexual assault, in which case a 
civil action may be brought.").  
See also 29 U. Haw. L. Rev. 211, 
Hawai'i's Workers' Compensation 
Scheme: An Employer's License 
to Kill? (questioning the limited 
exception to exclusivity provided 
in Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-5 
(Year)). 
  
Idaho Wilful Physical 
Aggression 
Idaho Code Ann. § 72-
209 (providing that claim 
is not barred "where the 
injury or death is 
proximately caused by 
the wilful or unprovoked 
physical aggression of the 
employer"). 
Kearney v. Denker, 760 P.2d 
1171, 1173 (Idaho 1988) (internal 
citation omitted) ("The word 
'aggression' connotes 'an offensive 
action' such as an 'overt hostile 
attack.'  To prove aggression there 
must be evidence of some 
offensive action or hostile attack. 
It is not sufficient to prove that 
the alleged aggressor committed 
negligent acts that made it 




820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
305/11 (exclusive 
remedy). 
Copass v. Illinois Power Co., 569 
N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1991) (holding that an employee 
must “allege defendants had the 
specific intent to injure . . .”   
Allegations that the defendant 
“possessed a substantial certainty 
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State Approach Statute Case Law 
Indiana Purpose/Specific 
Intent (Judicial) 
Ind. Code § 22-3-2-
6 (year) (exclusive 
remedy).  
Baker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 637 
N.E.2d 1271, 1275, n.5 (Ind. 1994) 
(rejecting outright the substantial 
certainty standard and holding that 
"nothing short of deliberate intent to 
inflict an injury, or actual knowledge 
that an injury is certain to occur, will 
suffice"); Eichstadt v. Frisch's 
Restaurants, Inc., 879 N.E.2d 1207, 
1210-11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)(internal 
citations omitted)("Before an injury can 
be said to have been intended by an 
employer, two requirements must be 
met. First, the employer itself must 
have intended the injury . . . Second,the 
employer must have intended the injury 
or had actual knowledge that an injury 
was certain to occur.").  





Iowa Code § 85.20 
(Year) (exclusive 
remedy). 
Brcka v. St. Paul Travelers Companies, 
Inc., 366 F.Supp.2d 850, 855 (S.D.Iowa 
2005)("Unlike simple dissatisfaction of 
care claims or negligence actions, 
intentional torts do not fall within the 
exclusive remedy provision."); Beard v. 
Flying J, Inc. 266 F.3d 792 C.A.8 
(Iowa),2001. 
Kansas *No exception Kan. Stat. Ann. § 
44-5a07 (exclusive 
remedy). 
Tomlinson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas 
Corp., 770 P.2d 833, 838 (Kan. 
1989)(quoting Hormann v. New 
Hampshire Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 837, 
pincite (Kan. 1984)(“'As a general rule, 
exclusive of exceptions created in the 
Act itself, the Kansas Act's operation is 
exclusive of all other remedy and 
liability. Kansas cases have followed 
the principle that if the Kansas 
Workmen's Compensation Act affords 
the worker a remedy for the wrong, the 
compensation Act is exclusive, thus 
barring an independent tort action at 
common law.'”); Dillard v. Strecker, 
877 P.2d 371, 374 (Kan. 1994)(citation 
omitted)("[T]he provisions of the Act 
are to be liberally construed to bring 
workers under the Act whether or not it 
is desirable for the specific individual's 
circumstance."). 
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State Approach Statute Case Law 
Kentucky *Wilful Physical 
Aggression (may 
only be an 
exception for 
wilfull acts of 
employee not 
employer). 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 342.690 (West 
Year)(exclusivity 
"shall not apply in 
any case where the 
injury or death is 
proximately caused 
by the willful and 
unprovoked 
physical aggression 












compensation as the 
exclusive remedy 
except for 
intentional acts).  
Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475, 481 
(La. 1981) ("The meaning of 'intent' is 
that the person who acts either (1) 
consciously desires the physical result 
of his act, whatever the likelihood of 
that result happening from his conduct; 
or (2) knows that that result is 
substantially certain to follow from his 
conduct, whatever his desire may be as 
to that result."). 
Maine No Exception for 
Intentional Torts 
Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 
39, §§ 104, 408. 
Frank v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 352 F.Supp.2d 
8, 11 (D.Me. 2005) ("Maine courts have 
held that this exemption [from tort 
liability] applies not only to negligence, 
but to intentional torts as well."  Li v. 
C.N. Brown Co., 645 A.2d 606, 608 
(Me. 1994) ("The workers' 
compensation statute no longer requires 
injuries to have been accidental to fall 
within the scope of the Act. See, e.g., 
P.L.1973, ch. 389 (legislature deleted 
the words “by accident” from the 
statute). The Act applies to all work-
related injuries and deaths, however 




Md. Code Ann., 





"deliberate intent of 
the employer to 
injure or kill the 
covered 
employee"). 
Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of 
Delmarva, Inc., 503 A.2d 708, 712 
(Md. 1984) ("To bypass the exclusivity 
provided by a workmen’s compensation 
statute such as ours, the complaint must 
be based upon allegations of an 
intentional or deliberate act by the 
employer with a desire to bring about 
the consequences of the act.”). 
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State Approach Statute Case Law 
Massachusetts *No exception for 
intentional torts of 
employer as long 
as tort arises out 
of employment 
relationship. 
Mass. Gen. Laws 
ch. 152, § 24 
(Year)(exclusive 
remedy). 
Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 664 
N.E.2d 815, 818 (Mass. 1996)(stating 
that "[e]xcept for certain exceptions . . . 
intentional torts are covered by the 
workers' compensation act" and are 
therefore subject to the exclusivity 
provision); Fusaro v. Blakely, 661 
N.E.2d 1339, 1341 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1996)("A claim against a fellow worker 
for the commission of an intentional 
tort will be barred by the exclusivity 
clause of the Workers' Compensation 
Act, G.L. c. 152, § 24, if committed 
within the course of the worker's 




Mich. Comp. Laws 
§ 418.131 (Year) 
("The only 
exception to this 
exclusive remedy is 
an intentional tort. 
An intentional tort 
shall exist only 
when an employee 
is injured as a result 
of a deliberate act 
of the employer and 
the employer 
specifically 
intended an injury. 
An employer shall 
be deemed to have 
intended to injure if 
the employer had 
actual knowledge 
that an injury was 




Smith v. Mirror Lite Co., 492 N.W.2d 
744, 746 n. 1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) 
("1987 P.A. 28 amended the exclusive 
remedy provision of the WDCA.  
Before the amendment, whether a tort 
was intentional was determined by 
applying the ‘substantial certainty’ 
standard, whether the employer 
intended the act that caused the injury 
and knew that the injury was 
substantially certain to occur."). 
Minnesota Purpose/Specific 
Intent (Judicial) 
Minn. Stat. § 
176.031 ("The 
liability of an 
employer 
prescribed by this 
chapter is exclusive 
and in the place of 
any other liability to 
such employee."). 
Gunderson v. Harrington, 632 N.W.2d 
695, 703 (Minn. 2001) (requiring a 
"conscious and deliberate intent to 
inflict injury" for exception to apply; 
knowledge to a substantial certainty is 
insufficient). 
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State Approach Statute Case Law 
Mississippi Purpose/Specific 
Intent (Judicial) 
Miss. Code Ann. § 
71-3-9 (exclusive 
remedy). 
Franklin Corp. v. Tedford, 18 So.3d 
215, 221 (Miss. 2009) (internal citation 
omitted) ("Mississippi is in concurrence 
with an overwhelming majority of 
states in requiring an 'actual intent to 
injure' the employee."). 








Intent to Injure. 




"for personal injury 
or death of the 
employee by 
accident arising out 
of and in the course 
of the employee's 
employment" and 
explaining that 
"'accident' as used 
in this section shall 
include, but not be 
limited to, injury or 
death of the 
employee caused by 
the unprovoked 
violence or assault 
against the 
employee by any 
person").   
McCoy v. Liberty Foundry Co., 635 
S.W.2d 60, 62 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) 
(“[F]or employer conduct to be 
actionable as a ‘nonaccidental’ cause of 
injury, the employer must intentionally 
act with the specific purpose of thereby 
injuring the employee.").  But see 
Massey v. Victor L. Phillips, Co. 827 
F.Supp. 597, 599 (W.D.Mo.1993) 
("Thus, Missouri courts appear 
undaunted by the fact that the injury in 
question is the result of obviously 
intentional acts . . . In the court's view, 
these cases bring into doubt the 




Mont. Code Ann. § 
39-71-413(1),(3) 
(year) (establishing 
an exception to 
exclusivity for an 
intentional injury 
and defining 
intentional injury as 
"an injury caused 
by an intentional 
and deliberate act 
that is specifically 
and actually 
intended to cause 
injury to the 
employee injured 
and there is actual 
knowledge that an 
injury is certain to 
occur"). 
Alexander v. Bozeman Motors, Inc., 
234 P.3d 880, 886 (Mont. 2010) ("In 
other words, an 'intentional injury' has 
two required elements: (1) an 
intentional and deliberate act 
specifically and actually intended to 
cause injury; and (2) actual knowledge 
of the injury's certainty."). 
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State Approach Statute Case Law 
Nebraska No Exception for 
Intentional Torts of 
Employer (Judicial) 




officer, or director 
of an employer or 
insurer shall not 
apply in any case 
when the injury or 
death is proximately 








Harsh Intern., Inc. v. Monfort 
Industries, Inc., 662 N.W.2d 574, 579 
(Neb. 2003). 
(internal citation omitted) ("We have 
stated that the Act provides the 
exclusive remedy by the employee 
against the employer for any injury 
arising out of and in the course of the 
employment.  Thus, we have held that 
intentional acts of an employer fall 
within the scope of the Act."  
Nevada Purpose/Specific 
Intent 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 
616B.612 (year) 
(exclusive remedy). 
King v. Penrod Drilling Co., 652 
F.Supp. 1331,1334 (D. Nev. 1987) 




No Exception for 
Intentional Torts of 
Employer 
(Statutory/Judicial) 
N.H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 281-A:8 
(providing that 
employee's are 
presumed "to have 
waived all rights of 
action whether at 
common law or by 
statute or provided 
under the laws of 
any other state or 
otherwise: (a) 
Against the 
employer . . . and 
(b) Except for 
intentional torts, 
against any officer, 
director, agent, 
servant or employee 
acting on behalf of 
the employer").  
Karch v. BayBank FSB, 794 A.2d 763, 
770 (N.H. 2002.) (emphasis added) 
("An employee is entitled to 
compensation under the Workers' 
Compensation Law for ‘accidental 
injury or death arising out of and in the 
course of employment,’ RSA 281-A:2, 
XI, but may not bring a separate tort 
action against her employer. Indeed, the 
Workers' Compensation Law expressly 
provides that an employee subject to 
that chapter waives the right to bring 
such a separate action in exchange for 
the acceptance of benefits. RSA 281-
A:8, I(a). We note, however, an 
employee's waiver in exchange for 
benefits does not bar intentional tort 
actions against co-employees. RSA 
281-A:8, I(b)."). 
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State Approach Statute Case Law 







N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-8 
(exclusive remedy "except 
for intentional wrong"). 
Laidlow v. Hariton Machinery Co., 
Inc., 790 A.2d 884, 894 (2002) 
(explaining the Millison two-prong 
intentional wrong analysis: (1) conduct: 
subjectively intended to injure or 
substantially certain to injure (2) 
context: "the resulting injury and the 
circumstances of its infliction on the 
worker must be (a) more than a fact of 
life of industrial employment and (b) 
plainly beyond anything the Legislature 
intended the Workers' Compensation 
Act to immunize");  See also Van Dunk 
v. Reckson Associates Realty Corp., 2 
A.3d 456 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2010);  Millison v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 501 A.2d 505, 514 
(N.J. 1985) ("We must demand a virtual 
certainty."). 








N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-
6(E) (1978) (exclusive 
remedy). 
Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 
34 P.3d 1148, 1156 (N.M. 2001) 
(articulating 3 prong test: "(1) the 
worker or employer engages in an 
intentional act or omission, without just 
cause or excuse, that is reasonably 
expected to result in the injury suffered 
by the worker; (2) the worker or 
employer expects the intentional act or 
omission to result in the injury, or has 
utterly disregarded the consequences; 
and (3) the intentional act or omission 
proximately causes the injury"). 
New York *Not sure- 
case makes 
it sound like 
substantial 
certainty 






Compensation Law § 11 
(McKinney Year) (The 
employee must prove that 
the employer's acts were 
deliberate and intentional, 
not merely reckless. Injury 
resulting from the 
employer's negligence or 
recklessness are not 
exceptions to the exclusive 
liability rule . . . there must 
be proof that there was a 
specific act, or acts, 
directed at causing harm to 
the claimant, to take away 
the defense of workers' 
compensation as the 
exclusive remedy of the 
employee against the 
employer or co-
employee."). 
Acevedo v. Consolidated Edison Co. of 
N.Y., Inc., 596 N.Y.S.2d 68, 71 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1993) (internal quotations 
and citations omitted)("To sufficiently 
plead an intentional tort that will 
neutralize the statute's exclusivity there 
must be alleged an intentional or 
deliberate act by the employer directed 
at causing harm to the particular 
employee.  In order to constitute an 
intentional tort, the conduct must be 
engaged in with the desire to bring 
about the consequences of the act. A 
mere knowledge and appreciation of a 
risk is not the same as the intent to 
cause injury ... A result is intended if 
the act is done with the purpose of 
accomplishing such a result or with 
knowledge that to a substantial 
certainty such a result will ensue."). 
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N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-9 
(exclusive remedy). 
Seymour v. Lenoir County, 567 S.E.2d 
799, 801 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting 
Woodson v. Rowland, 407 S.E.2d 222, 
228 (N.C. 1991) ("Under a Woodson 
claim, a plaintiff can bring a civil suit 
against an employer based on 
intentional acts where 'an employer 
intentionally engages in misconduct 
knowing it is substantially certain to 
cause serious injury or death to 
employees and an employee is injured 
or killed by that misconduct.'"). 




N.D. Cent. Code § 65-04-
28 (exclusive remedy). 
Zimmerman v. Valdak Corp., 570 
N.W.2d 204, 209 (N.D. 1997)(check 
name of case) (rejecting the substantial 
certainty standard outright and holding 
that “[a]n employer is deemed to have 
intended to injure if the employer had 
knowledge an injury was certain to 




















Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 
2745.01(A),(B) (West 
Year) (providing 
exception if "the employer 
committed the tortious act 
with intent to injure 
another or with the belief 
that the injury was 
substantially certain to 
occur.  (B) As used in this 
section, “substantially 
certain” means that an 
employer acts with 
deliberate intent to cause 
an employee to suffer an 
injury, a disease, a 
condition, or death. 
Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., 
927 N.E.2d 1066, 1079 (Ohio 2010) 
(internal quotation and citation omitted) 
("When we consider the definition of 
‘substantial certainty,’ it becomes 
apparent that an employee does not 
have two ways to prove an intentional 
tort claim as R.C. 2745.01(A) suggests. 
The employee's two options of proof 
become: (1) the employer acted with 
intent to injure or (2) the employer 
acted with deliberate intent to injure. 
Thus, under R.C. 2745.01, the only way 
an employee can recover is if the 
employer acted with the intent to cause 
injury."). 
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Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 12 
(year) (change format- 
OLR does diff) 
(exclusive remedy 
"except in the case of 
an intentional tort."  
Specifies that an 
intentional tort “exist[s] 
only when the 
employee is injured as a 
result of willful, 
deliberate, specific 
intent of the employer 
to cause such injury.”   
A plaintiff’s successful 
demonstration “that the 
employer had 
knowledge that such 
injury was substantially 
certain to result from its 
conduct” is insufficient. 
Parret v. Unicco, 2005 OK 54, ¶ 2, 127 





Or. Rev. Stat. § 
656.156(2) (Year) ("If 
injury or death results 
to a worker from the 
deliberate intention of 
the employer of the 
worker to produce such 
injury or death, the 
worker, the widow, 
widower, child or 
dependent of the 
worker may take under 
this chapter, and also 
have cause for action 
against the employer, as 
if such statutes had not 
been passed, for 
damages over the 
amount payable under 
those statutes."). 
Lusk v. Monaco Motor Homes, Inc., 775 
P.2d 891, 894 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (“The 
statutory exemption applies only if the 
injury results ‘from the deliberate 
intention of the employer of the worker to 
produce such injury . . .'  That phrase 
requires, in addition to the intent that will 
normally suffice to prove an intentional 
tort, that the injury be ‘deliberate,’ in the 
sense that the employer has had an 
opportunity to weigh the consequences 
and to make a conscious choice among 
possible courses of action, and also that 
the employer specifically intend ‘to 
produce * * * injury’ to someone, 
although not necessarily to the particular 
employe[e] who was injured.").   
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77 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 481 
(Year) (The liability of 
an employer under this 
act shall be exclusive 
and in place of any and 
all other liability to 
such employe[e]s.") 
Barber v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 555 
A.2d 766, 770 (Pa. 1989) ("The 
significance of this provision indicates that 
the legislature, in its grant of immunity to 
fellow employees, expressly excluded 
intentional misconduct. However, in the 
immunity provided for the employer, 
under section 303 of the ODA no such 
exception was engrafted. This omission 
cannot be lightly ignored. It is obvious that 
the legislature considered the issue of 
intentional torts and created an exception 
to the statutory immunity when intentional 
harm was caused by the co-employee. The 
legislature's failure to provide a similar 
exclusion to the immunity provided for the 
employer must be deemed to have been 
deliberate."); Holdampf v. Fidelity & Cas. 
Co. of N.Y., 793 F.Supp. 111, 113 (W.D. 
Pa. 1992)("In Poyser v. Newman & Co., 
514 Pa. 32, 522 A.2d 548, 550 (1987), the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court definitively 
held that the intentional tort exception to 
the exclusivity provision, to the extent that 
it was ever alive in Pennsylvania, was now 
dead. The court explained and reaffirmed 
this holding in Barber v. Pittsburgh 
Corning Corp., 521 Pa. 29, 555 A.2d 766, 
770 (1989) ('In this Court's decision in 
Poyser, supra, we expressly held ... that 
there was no intentional tort exception to 
the exclusivity provision of the WCA.'"). 







R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-
29-20 (exclusive 
remedy). 
Nassa v. Hook-SupeRx, Inc., 790 A.2d 
368, 372 (R.I. 2002) ("As both sides note 
in their briefs, this Court repeatedly has 
held that there is no wholesale intentional-
tort exception to the exclusive-remedy 
doctrine, as codified in § 28-29-20. Thus, 
the WCA provides the exclusive remedy 
for work-related personal injuries “under 
chapters 29-38 of this title [28]”-even if 
the injury-causing conduct of the alleged 
tortfeasor was intentional."); Diaz v. 
Darmet Corp., 694 A.2d 736, 737 (R.I. 
1997) ("[I]n Rhode Island neither the 
Legislature nor this court has created an 
intentional tort exception to the mandate 
of § 28-29-20."). 
  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
126 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:75 
 
 







S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-
540 (1976) (exclusive 
remedy). 
Peay v. U.S. Silica Co., 437 S.E.2d 64, 65-
66 (S.C. 1993)(Explicitly rejecting the 
substantial certainty standard and holding 
"that only those injuries inflicted by an 
employer who acts with a deliberate or 
specific intent to injure are exempted from 
the exclusive remedy of workers' 
compensation coverage"). 
South Dakota Substantial 
Certainty 
(Judicial) 
S.D. Codified Laws § 
62-3-1; 62-3-2 
(providing exclusive 
liability for employer 
and remedy for 
employee, respectively, 
"except rights and 
remedies arising from 
intentional tort"). 
Jensen v. Sport Bowl, Inc., 469 N.W.2d 
370, 372 (S.D. 1991) (holding the injured 
employee "must also allege facts that 
plausibly demonstrate an actual intent by 
the employer to injure or a substantial 
certainty that injury will be the inevitable 




Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-
6-108 (exclusive 
remedy). 
Bishop v. Woodbury Clinical Laboratory, 
Inc., Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1609949 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2010)(citing Gonzales v. Alman 
Constr. Co., 857 S.W.2d 42, 48 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1993)) ("Tennessee law does 
recognize an exception to this exclusive 
remedy provision in instances where the 
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State Approach Statute Case Law 
Texas Substantial 
Certainty 
Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 
408.001(B) (West 
Year) (check cite 
because of new code) 
(exclusive remedy 
except allows suit for 
"exemplary damages 
by the surviving 
spouse or heirs of the 
body of a deceased 
employee whose death 
was caused by an 
intentional act or 
omission of the 
employer or by the 
employer's gross 
negligence"); Tex. 
Civ. Prac. & Rem. 
Code Ann. § 
41.001(11) defines 
"gross negligence" to 
mean "an act or 
omission: (A) which 
when viewed 
objectively from the 
standpoint of the actor 
at the time of its 
occurrence involves 
an extreme degree of 
risk, considering the 
probability and 
magnitude of the 
potential harm to 
others; and (B) of 
which the actor has 
actual, subjective 




indifference to the 
rights, safety, or 
welfare of others. 
Urdiales v. Concord Technologies 
Delaware, Inc., 120 S.W.3d 400, 406-07 
(Tex. App. 2003) (inteneral quotations and 
citations omitted) ("Mere negligence or 
willful negligence will not suffice because 
the specific intent to inflict injury is 
lacking.  'Intent' means the actor desires to 
cause [the] consequences of his act, or that 
he believes that the consequences are 









Thomas v. National Semiconductor, Inc., 
827 F.Supp. 1550, 1552 (D. Utah 
1993)(requiring a showing of "deliberate 
intent directed to the purpose of inflicting 
an injury"); Cerka v. Salt Lake County 
988 F.Supp. 1420, 1422 (D. Utah 1997) 
(quoting Lantz v. National Semiconductor 
Corp., 775 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989))("[F]or a defendant to be held liable 
for an 'intentional act,' she must have 
'manifested a deliberate intent to injure.'"). 
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Court has left 







Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 
622 (exclusive 
remedy). 
Kittell v. Vermont Weatherboard, Inc., 
417 A.2d 926, 927 (Vt. 1980)("Nothing 
short of a specific intent to injure falls 
outside the scope of the Act.").  But see 
Garger v. Desroches, 974 A.2d 597, 602 
n.3 (Vt. 2009)(citing Mead v. Western 
Slate, Inc., 848 A.2d 257 (Vt. 
2004))(declining to address "whether the 
broadened definition of specific intent 
identified in Mead [which includes 
substantial certainty] should be adopted" 
because the plaintiff did "not allege[] that 
defendant knew with substantial certainty 





Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-
307 (Year)(exclusive 
remedy). 
McGreevy v. Racal-Dana Instruments, 
Inc., 690 F.Supp. 468, 468 (E.D. Va. 
1988)("Thus where an employer commits 
an intentional tort with the intent to injure 
an employee, this Court concludes that an 







Wash. Rev. Code § 
51.24.020 (Year) ("If 
injury results to a 
worker from the 
deliberate intention of 
his or her employer to 
produce such injury, 
the worker or 
beneficiary of the 
worker shall have the 
privilege to take under 
this title and also have 
cause of action against 
the employer as if this 
title had not been 
enacted, for any 
damages in excess of 
compensation and 
benefits paid or 
payable under this 
title."). 
Birklid v. Boeing Co., 904 P.2d 278, 285 
(Wash. 1995)(rejecting outright the 
substantial certainty standard and holding 
that "the phrase 'deliberate intention' in 
RCW 51.24.020 means the employer [(1)] 
had actual knowledge that an injury was 
certain to occur and [(2)] willfully 
disregarded that knowledge").  
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D.C. Code § 32-1504 (Year) 
(exclusive remedy). 
Grillo v. National Bank of 
Washington, 540 A.2d 
743, 744 (D.C. 1988)("We 
hold that only injuries 
specifically intended by the 
employer to be inflicted on 
the particular employee 
who is injured fall outside 
of the exclusivity 
provisions of the WCA and 
that the evidence presented 
to show the employer's 
knowledge with substantial 
certainty that an injury will 
result from an act does not 
equate with the specific 
intent to injure or kill when 
the injury is caused by the 
intentional act of a third 
person."); Feirson v. 
District of Columbia, 506 
F.3d 1063, 1068 (D.C. 
2007) (citing Grillo v. 
National Bank of 
Washington, 540 A.2d 
743, 744 (D.C. 1988)) 
("Grillo recognized an 
intentional injury 
exception to the District's 
Workers' Compensation 
Act (WCA), which applies 
only when the employer 
specifically intended to 
injure the employee."). 
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State Approach Statute Case Law 
West Virginia Akin to 
Substantial 
Certainty 
(specific intent or 
5 statutory 
requirements) 
W. Va. Code § 23-4-2(d)(2) 
(2002) (fix quotes) (providing 
exception to exclusivity if 
employer acted with the 
"diliberate intention" to cause 
injury.  (stating standard of 
"deliberate intention" may only be 
met if: (1) the employer "acted 
with a consciously, subjectively 
and deliberately formed intention 
to produce the specific result of 
injury or death to an employee. 
This standard requires a showing 
of an actual, specific intent . . . or" 
(2) all of the following five (5) 
conditions are satisfied: (A) That 
a specific unsafe working 
condition existed in the workplace 
which presented a high degree of 
risk and a strong probability of 
serious injury or death; (B) That 
the employer, prior to the injury, 
had actual knowledge of the 
existence of the specific unsafe 
working condition and of the high 
degree of risk and the strong 
probability of serious injury or 
death presented by the specific 
unsafe working condition; (C) the 
specific unsafe working condition 
was a violation of a state or 
federal safety law or of a 
commonly accepted and well-
known safety standard within the 
industry or business of the 
employer; (D) the employer 
intentionally exposed an 
employee to the specific unsafe 
working condition; and (E) the 
specific unsafe working condition 
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Wis. Stat § 102.03(2) 
("Where such 
conditions exist the 
right to the recovery of 
compensation under 
this chapter shall be the 
exclusive remedy 
against the employer, 
any other employee of 
the same employer and 
the worker's 
compensation insurance 
carrier. This section 
does not limit the right 
of an employee to bring 
action against any 
coemployee for an 
assault intended to 
cause bodily harm.") 
Rivera v. Safford, 377 N.W.2d 187, 189 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1985) ("The Worker's 
Compensation Act, ch. 102, Stats., 
provides an exclusive remedy against the 
employer or a coemployee to an employee 
who is injured while performing service 
growing out of and incidental to his or her 
employment, where the accident causing 
the injury arises out of his or her 
employment. Sec. 102.03(1)(c), (1)(e), and 
(2), Stats.; Goranson v. DILHR, 94 Wis.2d 
537, 549, 289 N.W.2d 270, 276 
(1980) (citation omitted). An employee, 
however, may bring an action against a 
coemployee for an assault intended to 
cause bodily harm.Sec. 102.03(2)."); 
Aslakson v. Gallagher Bassett Services, 
Inc., 729 N.W.2d 712 (Wis 2007)(See 
alsoGuse v. A.O. Smith Corp., 260 Wis. 
403, 406-07, 51 N.W.2d 24 (1952) (“In 
enacting the Act, the legislature intended 
to impose upon employers an absolute 
liability, regardless of fault; and in return 
for this burden, intended to grant 
employers immunity from all tort liability 
on account of injuries to employees.”); 
Vick v. Brown, 38 N.W.2d 716, 719 
(1949) ( “[The employer's liability] is 
solely under the workmen's compensation 








Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-
14-104(a) (providing 
exclusive remedy 
"unless the employees 
intentionally act to 
cause physical harm or 
injury to the injured 
employee.") (emphasis 
added). 
Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 
P.2d 885, 888-89 (Wyo. 1984)(internal 
citation and quotations omitted)(holding 
that employer's enjoy "absolute immunity 
from tort actions including the employer's 
violation of his duty of care whether the 
negligence is ordinary or culpable . . . 
[t]his is to say that immunity is 
absolute . . . Our various interpretations of 
§ 27-12-103(a), W.S.1977, reflect the 
absolute immunity afforded contributing 
employers under the worker's 
compensation laws of Wyoming.").  
Parker v. Energy Development Co., 691 
P.2d 981, 985 (Wyo. 1984)(holding an 
employer "is absolutely immune from all 
common-law tort remedies arising out of 
the injury to or death of the employee-
including causes of action for intentional 




Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
